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REJOINING TREATIES
Jean Galbraith*
Historical practice supports the conclusion that the President can
unilaterally withdraw the United States from treaties which an earlier
President joined with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate,
at least as long as this withdrawal is consistent with international law.
This Article considers a further question that to date is deeply
underexplored. This is: does the original Senate resolution of advice
and consent to a treaty remain effective even after a President has
withdrawn the United States from a treaty? I argue that the answer to
this question is yes, except in certain limited circumstances. This
answer in turn has important consequences. It means that, as a matter
of U.S. domestic law, a future President can rejoin treaties without
needing to return to the Senate for advice and consent. The Article
concludes by situating this claim within a broader account of the
distribution of foreign affairs powers.
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This Article focuses on a single doctrinal question: what domestic legal
process is necessary for the United States to rejoin a treaty from which it
has been unilaterally withdrawn by the President? More specifically, may
a President seeking to rejoin a treaty do so in reliance of the original
resolution of advice and consent passed by the Senate, or must he or she
return to the Senate for a second resolution?
This is a question that has received no sustained attention in scholarship
or in practice. This itself is a cause for celebration, a reflection of the fact
that unilateral treaty withdrawals by Presidents historically have been rare
and usually well-founded. It was controversial when President Carter
unilaterally withdrew the United States from its mutual defense treaty
with Taiwan, but his successor quickly came to recognize the value of
normalized relations with mainland China.1
Since coming to office, President Trump has pursued a policy of
international disengagement on many fronts. To date, he has focused
mainly on rolling back international commitments made by President
Obama which the United States had joined not as “treaties” in the
constitutional sense of the word, but rather through other constitutional
pathways.2 Yet he and his administration have also shown a willingness
to terminate treaties—legal instruments that received the advice and

1
Compare Carter’s Vow on Taiwan Is Demanded by Reagan, N.Y. Times (Feb. 11, 1979),
https://perma.cc/MB97-MVMN (describing Ronald Reagan’s expressed support for a lawsuit
challenging this withdrawal in 1979), with Katharine Macdonald & Robert G. Kaiser, Reagan
Declares He Seeks Only To Hold to Taiwan Relations Act, Wash. Post (Aug. 26, 1980),
https://perma.cc/6FXF-TCHB (describing Reagan’s shift during his campaign to a
commitment that he “would not try to fundamentally alter the U.S. relationship with Peking
or Taiwan”).
2
E.g., Stephen P. Mulligan, Cong. Research Serv., R44761, Withdrawal from International
Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement 17–23
(2018), https://perma.cc/3Y4K-NB8D (describing President Trump’s withdrawal from the
Iran nuclear deal and his announced future withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate).
For a discussion of the alternative pathways that exist under U.S. domestic law for joining
international commitments, see Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments:
The Changing Landscape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1675, 1684–97 (2017).
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consent of two-thirds of the Senate and thus commanded, at least at one
point in history, strong bipartisan support.3 Specifically:

3

•

News reporting early in the Trump administration indicated
that it planned to conduct a widespread review of all multilateral treaties other than those “directly related to national
security, extradition, or international trade” in order to assess
“whether the United States should continue to be a party . . . .”4

•

In October 2018, the Trump administration announced the
immediate or planned U.S. withdrawal from three treaties: the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;
the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
with Iran; and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty with Russia and other former Soviet Republics.5

•

In remarks related to two of these withdrawals, then-National
Security Advisor John Bolton signaled that the Trump
administration would more generally consider withdrawing
from treaties or treaty provisions in which the United States had
consented to the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice.6

Here and throughout this Article, I use “treaty” and “treaties” to refer to international
agreements for which the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate is being sought or
has been obtained. See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law pt. 3, intro. note (Am.
Law Inst. 2018) (“In U.S. domestic law, . . . the term ‘treaties’ refers . . . to international
agreements concluded by the President with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate.”).
4
Read the Trump Administration’s Draft of the Executive Order on Treaties, Wash. Post,
https://perma.cc/B555-4VXG (posting a leaked draft of an executive order under
consideration that contained this language); see also Max Fisher, Trump Prepares Orders
Aiming at Global Funding and Treaties, N.Y. Times (Jan. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/REE9GPQ9 (reporting on the draft executive order).
5
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, Trump
Administration Announces Withdrawal from Four International Agreements, 113 Am. J. Int’l
L. 132, 132 (Jean Galbraith ed., 2019); Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, United States Initiates Withdrawal from Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty, 113 Am. J. Int’l L. 631, 632 n.5 (Jean Galbraith ed., 2019).
6
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sarah Sanders, Small Business Administrator Linda
McMahon, and National Security Advisor, White House (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://perma.cc/D99Y-X4AW.
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President Trump has repeatedly expressed doubts about NATO
and has indicated some interest in withdrawing from the North
Atlantic Treaty which underlies it.7

As a matter of U.S. domestic law, the executive branch considers itself
authorized to withdraw from treaties without receiving explicit approval
to do so from Congress or the Senate, at least provided that the withdrawal
is consistent with international law. Although his position has never
received the explicit blessing of the U.S. Supreme Court, it is now wellgrounded in executive branch practice and it has been accepted both by
the Restatement (Third) and the recent Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign
Relations Law.8 The prospect of landmark treaties being terminated at the
whim of President Trump has motivated some scholarly reexamination of
this issue.9 But requiring the explicit approval of Congress or two-thirds
of the Senate for treaty withdrawal raises its own normative concerns and
in any event is an uphill argument in light of past practice. And unless and
until such a claim succeeds with the courts (or Congress explicitly
legislates to block termination), President Trump and his successors will
continue to possess the putative power of treaty withdrawal.
This Article therefore focuses on the issue of rejoining treaties. The
more polarized the office of the Presidency becomes—and the more it is
held by individuals who act based on caprice rather than expertise—the
greater the likelihood there is that one President will withdraw from
treaties that a later President will wish to rejoin. Such rejoining would
7

See, e.g., The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Theresa May of the
United Kingdom in Buckinghamshire, United Kingdom, 2018, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. No.
DCPD-201800483, at 6 (July 13, 2018) (“NATO is really there for Europe, much more so
than us. It helps Europe whether—no matter what our military people or your military people
say, it helps Europe more than it helps us.”); Julian E. Barnes & Helene Cooper, Trump
Discussed Pulling U.S. from NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns over Russia, N.Y. Times
(Jan. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/S8TP-59V3 (reporting that President Trump has privately
expressed interest in withdrawing from NATO on multiple occasions).
8
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 339 (Am. Law Inst. 1987); Restatement
(Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 313 (Am. Law Inst. 2018). In Goldwater v. Carter, the
Supreme Court deemed nonjusticiable the question of whether President Carter could
terminate the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan in a manner consistent with its termination
clause but without approval from two-thirds of the Senate or from Congress. 444 U.S. 996,
1002 (1979) (plurality opinion) (finding that the case posed a political question); id. at 997
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (viewing the case to be unripe).
9
E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential Power to Terminate International Agreements, 128
Yale L.J. F. 432, 435 (2018).
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have to be not only feasible at the international level (i.e., consistent with
international law and receiving any necessary approval from treaty
partners), but also legal as a matter of domestic law.
This Article is not the first piece to consider the issue of the process for
rejoining treaties. Back in 1986, for example, shortly after President
Reagan withdrew the United States from the general jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, a student comment on the subject stated
without analysis that rejoining “would be contingent on the advice and
consent of the Senate.”10 More recently and more significantly, a former
leading practitioner for the State Department in the climate context, Sue
Biniaz, sketched out some thoughts about the legal process for rejoining
in a conference thought paper. Raising the possibility that President
Trump might withdraw from the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, she floated the idea that “a new Administration [could] take the
position that the Senate’s original resolution of advice and consent had
not expired and, as such, the President was free to [resubmit] an
instrument of ratification.”11 Yet while the idea of rejoining treaties is not
new to this paper, it is a subject that to date has not received sustained
scholarly treatment, unlike the issue of treaty withdrawal.
There are three ways by which the President might rejoin a treaty as a
matter of domestic law. One obviously lawful way would be to go back
to the Senate for another round of advice and consent by a supermajority.
But getting treaties through the Senate has always been challenging and
is now even harder than it used to be, due both to increased partisanship
and to changed procedural norms. Indeed, from 2001 through 2010, the
Senate advised and consented to only one treaty where there were any
recorded dissenting votes.12 To require another round of Senate advice
and consent to rejoin treaties would cause such rejoining to range from
challenging to effectively impossible.
A second option would be to rejoin the international agreement not as
a treaty but rather through some other domestic process. U.S.
constitutional practice has developed several domestic pathways distinct
10
Douglas J. Ende, Comment, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice: A Proposal for a New United States Declaration, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1145,
1162 n.117 (1986).
11
Susan Biniaz, U.S. Intent to Withdraw from the Paris Agreement: A Round-up of
Interesting Legal Issues that Either Arose or Might Have Arisen 8 (unpublished paper from
the 2017 Duke-Yale Foreign Relations Law Roundtable, on file with author); see also id. at
8–9 (elaborating on this point).
12
Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 247, 287 (2012).
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from that set out in the Treaty Clause by which the United States can join
international agreements.13 Some important agreements are made by the
executive branch without specific legislative approval, such as President
Obama’s decision to join the United States to the Paris Agreement on
climate.14 Others, such as most major trade agreements, receive specific
approval from Congress.15 There is considerable uncertainty about the
extent to which the uses of these other pathways are constitutionally
permissible. Accordingly, these alternative pathways might be available
as a matter of law for some or even all international agreements which the
United States initially joined as treaties but later withdrew from based on
unilateral presidential action.16 Even if lawful, however, rebranding a
former treaty as an agreement that could be joined in a manner akin to the
Paris Agreement rather than as an Article II treaty would likely raise
procedural concerns within the State Department, face congressional
pushback, and potentially complicate the agreement’s implementation.
Going to Congress for statutory approval prior to rejoining would reduce
concerns about legality and implementation. But obtaining such approval
would likely prove difficult as a matter of legislative process, particularly
if the shift from treaty to congressional-executive agreement triggered
resistance from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The third option, whose legality and availability are the focus of this
Article, would be to treat the Senate’s pre-existing resolution of advice
and consent as still operative. The President could therefore rejoin the
international agreement as a treaty, but without having to go again to the
Senate for advice and consent. This approach would presumptively put
rejoining on equal footing with withdrawing in terms of the domestic legal
process. The presumption would be overcome, however, if rejoining
would be inconsistent with the language of the original resolution, with
any modifications to this resolution made by two-thirds of the Senate, or
with an intervening congressional statute. The President’s ability to rejoin
13

For an overview of these kinds of agreements, see Galbraith, supra note 2, at 1684–97.
See id. at 1731–43 (analyzing the process by which the United States joined the Paris
Agreement and discussing the extent to which this process contained constraints on executive
power).
15
Id. at 1703, 1727 (noting that the success of this process relies heavily on pre-existing
legislation that ensures an up-and-down congressional vote for trade agreements).
16
This is a complex issue even for entirely new international agreements and would be even
more complicated with respect to the rejoining of international agreements previously made
as treaties. In those cases, it would present the further question of whether the initial treatment
of the agreement as a “treaty” might limit the availability of other options as a matter of law.
14
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the treaty would also be contingent on this being an available option at
the international level.
The doctrinal basis for treating original Senate resolutions of advice
and consent as still operative rests on these resolutions’ text, on broader
constitutional practice, and on structural principles. As a textual matter,
while the Senate often puts substantial conditions into its resolutions of
advice and consent, it typically does not include language that renders
them ineffective for purposes of rejoining. As a matter of constitutional
practice, while there is no specific practice on point for the issue of
rejoining, two related strands suggest that the original resolutions should
be taken to remain operative. First, these resolutions are already
understood to remain operative well after the end of the Senate session in
which they are passed, as the executive branch often does not ratify
treaties until years after the Senate’s advice and consent has been given.
Second, with respect to international agreements other than treaties that
rely on some form of congressional authorization, the executive branch
has used pre-existing authorizations as a basis for rejoining such
agreements following withdrawal. In 2003, for example, President
George W. Bush rejoined the United States to UNESCO (from which
President Reagan had withdrawn the United States) in apparent reliance
on the statutory authorization that has justified the initial U.S. entry into
UNESCO many years earlier.17 Finally, as a structural principle, treating
original Senate resolutions of advice and consent as remaining effective
prevents the President from being singlehandedly able, through
withdrawal, to undo the actions of a coordinate branch. It is one thing for
the President to be able to withdraw the United States unilaterally from a
treaty—after all, the President has unilateral discretion over whether to
ratify the treaty. It is quite another thing for the President thereby to
effectively erase a Senate resolution, unless the Senate or Congress
expressly authorized this result.
The claim that a President can rely on the initial resolution of advice
and consent to rejoin a treaty fits into a broader framework for the
distribution of foreign affairs powers. Foreign relations law rests in an
uneasy space between contrasts—foreign and domestic, congressional
and presidential, flexible and constrained. A long-standing strand of
scholarship raises concerns about the rise of presidential power and about
17

See Curtis A. Bradley, Exiting Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 Duke L.J. 1615,
1639 (2018) (describing the withdrawal from UNESCO by the Reagan administration and its
rejoining by the George W. Bush administration).

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

80

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 106:73

the implications of this rise for U.S. international engagement.18 The
approach advocated for here in some ways both advances presidential
power and brings uncertainty to international law. It advances presidential
power by advocating an understanding of Senate resolutions that gives
the President the power to treat them as ongoing authorizations, and it
brings uncertainty by creating a pathway whereby presidents can zig-zag
their way through treaties, if they so choose. In other ways, however, the
approach advocated for here both serves as a check on presidential power
and a mechanism for continuing international engagement on the part of
the United States. For a legal framework in which the President can
unilaterally withdraw from a treaty but not unilaterally rejoin it would be
a legal framework that puts a heavy thumb on the scale against
international engagement and that limits rebalancing by a future
President. The approach advocated for here, by contrast, relies on a
broader, developing alignment between U.S. foreign relations law and
U.S. administrative law. In both cases, the executive branch wields
considerable power, but in both cases the decisions of one administration
can be revisited by another administration and thus are subject to the longterm checks of democracy.
In terms of structure, this Article has three parts. Part I is descriptive,
identifying existing law and practice with respect to treaty formation and
withdrawal. Part II is the core of the Article. It elaborates on and defends
the doctrinal argument sketched above with respect to treaty rejoining. It
argues that Senate resolutions of advice and consent can constitutionally
authorize rejoining and, as a matter of their interpretation, should
presumptively be read to do so. It also discusses limitations stemming
from domestic law, international law, and international relations that
might prevent rejoining with respect to particular treaties. Finally, it
assesses the practical effect of a presidential power to rejoin treaties and
emphasizes that this power is much more likely to be workable with
respect to multilateral treaties which are open broadly to membership than
with respect to bilateral treaties, which cannot be re-established without
the consent of the other nation. Part III situates the doctrinal argument
made in Part II within a broader theory of the constitutional distribution
of foreign affairs powers.

18
For a recent and important piece in this vein, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Presidential Control Over International Law, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1201 (2018).
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I. TREATY FORMATION AND WITHDRAWAL
To rejoin a treaty, the United States must first have joined and left it.
In this Part, I describe the substantial U.S. law and practice that exists
with respect to the formation of treaties and the more meager law and
practice that exists with respect to withdrawal. The concepts set forth here
are foundational for understanding how the United States might rejoin a
treaty.
A. Formation
The Constitution’s Treaty Clause provides that the President “shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”19 In the
years since the Framing, the political branches have developed a set of
practices for treaty-making based partly on this sparse text, partly on
international legal practice, and partly on their own process choices.
The formation of most treaties involves five stages in the following
order: international negotiation by the executive branch, signature by the
President or an authorized executive branch official, advice and consent
by two-thirds of the Senate, ratification by the President or an authorized
executive branch official, and finally entry into force as a legally binding
instrument.20 (I defer discussion of a further important issue—treaty
implementation—until later in this Article.21) Negotiation, signature,
ratification, and entry into force all take place on the international plane,
involve international counterparts, and are subject to the ground rules of

19

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See Cong. Research Serv., Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the
United States Senate 6–12, 97–156 (2001) [hereinafter CRS Report for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee] (providing an extensive discussion of these processes). There has been
plenty of variation throughout history, including situations where the Senate has called for the
initiation of negotiations, see id. at 100–01; where members of Congress have been among
those signing a treaty, see id. at 111; where the international process for treaty approval is not
ratification in the technical sense but rather some variant like accession, see id. at 147; and
even some instances where the Senate’s advice and consent has preceded the conclusion of
negotiations, see Galbraith, supra note 12, at 261–63, 271–73. I return to the distinction
between ratification and accession later in this Article. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
21
See infra Subsection II.B.3.
20
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international law.22 By contrast, the Senate’s advice and consent is a
purely domestic legal procedure.23
In giving advice and consent, the Senate’s typical practice is to pass a
resolution that states: “Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present
concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification
of” the treaty in question.24 Sometimes the Senate attaches additional
qualifications—reservations,
understandings,
declarations,
and
25
conditions—as part of its resolution of ratification. These qualifications
are understood to be intrinsic parts of the Senate’s consent, such that the
President can only proceed to ratification pursuant to their terms.26

22

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets forth these ground rules. See generally
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 332 (stating
that disputes over treaties should be settled in conformity with international law principles).
While the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it “considers many of the
provisions of the Vienna Convention . . . to constitute customary international law on the law
of treaties.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Frequently Asked Questions, Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, https://perma.cc/3AHS-UBTE.
23
The Vienna Convention does not discuss what domestic legal procedures are needed as a
precursor to ratification, and it makes clear that, as a matter of international law, a nation’s
consent to a treaty is presumptively valid even if that nation has failed to follow its domestic
legal procedures. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, art. 46 (noting an
exception if the failure to follow domestic legal procedures “concerned a rule of its internal
law of fundamental importance” and “would be objectively evident to any State conducting
itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith”).
24
E.g., S. Exec. Journal, 89th Congress, 1st Sess. 824 (1965) (using this format to provide
advice and consent to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, together with its
Optional Protocol); see also CRS Report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supra
note 20, at 123 (noting that this is the usual form of such resolutions).
25
E.g., S. Exec. Journal, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 366–70 (1988) (providing the Senate’s
advice and consent to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty subject to various
conditions, understandings, and declarations); see also CRS Report for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, supra note 20, at 124–36 (discussing practice in this regard).
26
See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 305 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 2018)
(“If the President does proceed to ratify the treaty, he or she is deemed to have accepted any
conditions that the Senate has included with its advice and consent that relate to the treaty and
are not inconsistent with the Constitution.”); see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
§ 303 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1987) (“But a condition having plausible relation to the treaty, or
to its adoption or implementation, is presumably not improper, and if the President proceeds
to make the treaty he is bound by the condition.”); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 375
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“If [conditions given by the Senate] are not agreed
to by the President, his only constitutionally permissible course is to decline to ratify the
treaty . . . .”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399, 403 (2000) (“[R]egardless of the legality of
[reservations, understandings, and declarations] under international law, they are valid under
domestic constitutional law . . . .”).
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Four features of the treaty formation process are especially noteworthy
for purposes of this Article. First, the stages of treaty formation are not
subject to time limits as a matter of constitutional text or practice.27 Often
these stages happen in close temporal proximity, but sometimes years or
even decades pass between them. In a recent article, Saikrishna Prakash
has questioned the constitutionality of these time lags, but he
acknowledges their apparent endlessness as a matter of practice.28 The
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and its Optional Protocol,
for example, were signed during the Kennedy administration in 1961,
advised and consented to by the Senate in 1965 during the Johnson
administration, and ratified by the United States in 1972 during the Nixon
administration.29 The Genocide Convention took over thirty-seven years
from signature to the Senate’s advice and consent.30 Four treaties relating
27
By contrast, the Constitution contains a timing rule for the passage of statutes. See U.S.
Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing that if “any Bill shall not be returned by the President within
ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a
Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent
its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law”).
28
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Of Synchronicity and Supreme Law, 132 Harv. L. Rev.
1220, 1248 (2019) (“Although one cannot say for certain, it seems as if there is no limit on
when, after Senate consent, the President may sign a ratification instrument.”); cf. id. at 1285
(arguing that the Senate’s advice and consent should be deemed to expire if much longer than
seven years passes between the Senate resolution and ratification). Prakash’s argument for
limited time frames turns on the view that “[o]ne crucial element of majority rule is the
requirement that those in favor of some proposition—be it a bill, constitutional amendment,
or some candidate—actually constitute a majority at a given moment in time.” Id. at 1224. He
infers this position from structural premises about democracy, while saying relatively little
about the fact that the two processes whose current timing rules he most criticizes—treatymaking and constitutional amendments—are non-democratic in the sense that they require
heavy supermajorities. See id. (not addressing this issue in the overview of his argument); see
also id. at 1252 (mentioning only in passing that there is a two-thirds requirement for treaties
“because the Constitution says as much”). Were Prakash’s approach to be adopted, it would
have the effect of making treaty-making and constitutional amendments even more
challenging to accomplish. This in turn would be in tension with Prakash’s broader concern
about “dead-hand” rule, see id. at 1224 n.25, as it would make our existing Constitution, laws,
and treaties even harder to amend.
29
See U.N. Treaty Collection, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 3,
https://perma.cc/56X8-N4WH (containing depository information); U.N. Treaty Collection,
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 2, https://perma.cc/Z75L-EKJR (containing depository
information); see also S. Exec. Journal, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 824 (1965) (recording that
eighty-five senators voted to ratify the Convention and its optional protocol).
30
95 Cong. Rec. 7825 (1949) (transmitting the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent
and noting that signature occurred on Dec. 11, 1948); 132 Cong. Rec. 2349–50 (1986)
(containing the resolution of advice and consent). See generally Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The
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to nuclear security received the Senate’s advice and consent in 2008 but
were not ratified until 2015.31 Another treaty—the Basel Convention on
the Transportation of Hazardous Waste—received advice and consent in
1992 and is still a candidate for ratification.32 And these are just a few of
many possible examples.
Second, although timing limits on treaty formation are not
constitutionally imposed, as a matter of choice the political branches can
adopt them. In the nineteenth century, the executive branch often
negotiated deadlines for the international exchange of ratifications into
the text of treaties. When these deadlines were missed despite timely
advice and consent from the Senate—as happened not infrequently—
presidents commonly returned to the Senate for a second round of advice
and consent.33 Separate from these incidents, there is at least one instance
where a President chose to return to the Senate for further advice and
consent simply because of a long passage of time between the Senate’s
advice and consent and ratification. This was in 1889, when President
Grover Cleveland returned to the Senate for a second round of advice and
consent to a naturalization treaty with Turkey. The Senate had initially
advised and consented to this treaty in 1875, but the conditions which it
United States and the Genocide Convention (1991) (describing the laborious efforts to obtain
the Senate’s advice and consent).
31
154 Cong. Rec. 21,775–77 (2008); The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Ratification of
Nuclear Security Treaties (Apr. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/7SHC-KYAD (noting that these
treaties were all ratified in 2015).
32
U.S. Dep’t of State, Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes Share (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://perma.cc/8GCV-PBMG (explaining that “before the United States can ratify the
Convention, there is a need for additional legislation to provide the necessary statutory
authority to implement its requirements.”).
33
As one example, Spain was late in ratifying the 1819 treaty with the United States
regarding the sale of Florida, and President Monroe therefore sought and received a second
round of advice and consent from the Senate. See S. Exec. Journal, 15th Cong., 2d Sess. 177–
78 (1819) (containing the initial resolution of advice and consent); S. Exec. Journal, 16th
Cong., 2d Sess. 242–43 (1821) (containing President Monroe’s letter requesting further advice
and consent, which explained that “[b]y the sixteenth article of that treaty, it was stipulated,
that the ratifications should be exchanged within six months from the day of its signature;
which time having elapsed, before the ratification of Spain was given, a copy, and translation
thereof, are now transmitted to the Senate, for their advice and consent to receive it in
exchange for the ratification of the United States, heretofore executed”); id. at 244 (containing
the Senate’s subsequent advice and consent to ratification). This is one of a fair number of
instances of nineteenth-century treaties whose ratifications were exchanged after the deadlines
contained in their own text. The usual but not invariable practice was to return to the Senate
for further advice and consent. See Samuel B. Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and
Enforcement 80–82 (Columbia Univ. Political Sci. Faculty eds., 1904) (describing this
practice and variations upon it).
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had attached to that resolution took Turkey fourteen years to accept.34 In
returning again to the Senate in 1889, Cleveland explained that “in view
of the long period that has elapsed since the Senate formerly considered
the treaty, I have deemed it wiser that, before proclaiming it, the Senate
should have an opportunity to act upon the matter again, my own views
being wholly favorable to the proclamation.”35 This choice was framed
on its face as matter of prudence (“I have deemed it wise”) rather than
law, and in 1908 the Solicitor for the Department of State took the
position regarding a treaty with a similar lapse of time that there was no
legal obligation to resubmit it to the Senate.36
A third notable feature of the process of treaty formation is that the
Senate’s advice and consent has become increasingly hard to obtain. The
two-thirds requirement has always been a high bar, effectively requiring
bipartisan support. Nonetheless, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
many important treaties were able to get through the Senate successfully
and in a timely manner. In the last twenty years, however, the difficulties
of getting any but the most routine treaties through the Senate have risen
starkly, presumably due to the rise of partisanship and the increased
willingness of Senators to use procedural rules to block the approval even
of treaties that would command a two-thirds majority.37 In a particularly
34

S. Exec. Journal, 50th Cong., 2d Sess. 467 (1889) (containing President Cleveland’s letter
of the prior day).
35
Id. The Senate unanimously provided its advice and consent on that same day, id. at 469,
but subject to a further condition regarding one article in the treaty. See W. Stull Holt, Treaties
Defeated by the Senate 130–31 (1933) (discussing this incident and noting that “[n]ot to be
outdone by the Senate the Turkish Government repeated its former action, or inaction, and
seven more years went by before it offered to exchange ratifications. But apparently the
Senate’s amendments were not fully accepted by Turkey and the treaty ended its unduly
protracted career.”).
36
5 Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law 63–64 (1943) (quoting
Memorandum of the Solicitor for the Department of State (Scott) of July 30, 1908) (observing
that “[s]o far as the legal questions are concerned, it is believed that [ratification without
resubmission to the Senate] can be legally done” and noting as precedent that “treaties have
heretofore been proclaimed by the President after a lapse from the date of signing of from
three to sixteen years, and ratifications have been exchanged after a like lapse of time”). At
issue was the potential ratification of an extradition treaty with France which had received the
Senate’s advice and consent fifteen years earlier in 1893. Id. at 63.
37
Senator Rand Paul, for example, single-handedly blocked a group of tax treaties for years
by withholding his consent to close debate on the treaties (which in turn had the effect of
preventing the treaties from receiving a floor vote unless floor debate is held over the treaties).
Diane Ring, When International Tax Agreements Fail at Home: A U.S. Example, 41 Brook.
J. Int’l L. 1185, 1197–207 (2016); see also Jim Tankersley, Senate Approves Tax Treaties for
First Time in Decade, N.Y. Times (July 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/CDJ7-9CHA (noting that
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striking example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
advanced out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee twice during the
George W. Bush administration—unanimously in 2004 and by a 17-4
vote in 2007—but it never received a floor vote.38 Indeed, between 2001
and 2010, the Senate gave advice and consent to just one treaty where
there were any recorded dissenting votes.39 The challenge of getting
treaties through has become so pronounced that Curtis Bradley, Oona
Hathaway, and Jack Goldsmith recently observed that “the Article II
treaty process may be dying.”40
The fourth important feature is that even after the Senate has given its
advice and consent, the President has discretion over whether or not to
ratify the treaty. Unlike legislation, for which Congress is the primary
actor, the Treaty Clause entrusts the leading role of “mak[ing]” treaties to
the President.41 It is rare, to be sure, for a President to decline to ratify a
treaty once the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent is in place.42 But
such incidents have happened in practice, and the President’s
constitutional discretion over ratification is well-recognized in
commentary.43 Unlike the Presentment Clause applicable to legislation,

the Senate finally succeeded in advising and consenting to four tax treaties in the summer of
2019).
38
Galbraith, supra note 12, at 302.
39
See id. at 287 (noting only one such treaty, the New START treaty with Russia, from
2001 to 2010).
40
Curtis Bradley, Oona Hathaway & Jack Goldsmith, The Death of Article II Treaties?,
Lawfare (Dec. 13, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/27N2-KNFY (providing further
information about the downward trend with respect to treaties).
41
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
42
Predictable reasons would include the President’s dissatisfaction with conditions attached
to the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent; issues that arise with respect to the other
treaty party or parties, such as their resistance to any conditions added by the Senate; and the
President’s decision to delay ratification until the passage of implementing legislation.
43
E.g., Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 303 (Am. Law Inst. 2018) (“After
the Senate provides its advice and consent, the President determines whether to ratify or
otherwise make the treaty on behalf of the United States.”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law § 303 reporters’ note 3 (Am. Law Inst. 1987) (“The President may decline to
make the treaty after the Senate has approved it.”); CRS Report for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, supra note 20, at 152 (observing that “U.S. law does not impose any
legal obligation on the President to ratify a treaty after the Senate has given its advice and
consent” and noting that “[n]umerous historical examples of Presidential non-ratification have
been cited by scholarly sources”); Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States
Constitution 184 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that “[o]nce the Senate has consented, the President is
free to make (or not to make) the treaty and the Senate has no further authority in respect of
it”).
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the Treaty Clause does not specify any way for the Senate or Congress to
override the President’s decision not to ratify a treaty.
B. Withdrawal
The text of the Constitution is silent on what domestic legal process is
necessary for treaty withdrawal. We have well-developed standards for
determining when withdrawal is consistent with international law—such
as where this withdrawal follows the process set forth in a withdrawal
provision in the treaty itself—but far less guidance about what process is
sufficient as a matter of domestic law.44 May the President unilaterally
withdraw the United States from a treaty, or does he or she need the
approval of either Congress or two-thirds of the Senate to do so?45
Those who think that the approval of Congress or two-thirds of the
Senate is required for treaty withdrawal can draw analogies to statutes.
While the Constitution contains no provision about statutory termination,
our constitutional practice does not authorize the President to terminate
statutes as a general rule.46 As Thomas Jefferson’s manual of practice for
the Senate stated, “[t]reaties being declared, equally with the laws of the
44

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets forth situations under which
withdrawal is permissible as a matter of international law, including where withdrawal is
consistent with the withdrawal clause, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note
22, art. 54, where there is no withdrawal clause but sufficient notice is given and either the
parties intended a right of withdrawal or such right “may be implied by the nature of the
treaty,” id. art. 56; where there is material breach and certain other circumstances are satisfied,
id. art. 60; where there is supervening impossibility of performance, id. art. 61; or where there
is a fundamental change of circumstances, id. art. 62. Most treaties contain withdrawal clauses.
See Barbara Koremenos, The Continent of International Law 124 (2016) (finding that 70% of
a sample of international agreements contain withdrawal clauses). See generally Laurence R.
Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1579 (2005) (discussing the practice of treaty exit
under international law).
45
I do not address the unresolved question of whether the President could withdraw from a
treaty in the face of congressional legislation or a condition in the Senate resolution of advice
and consent that explicitly barred him or her from doing so. See Restatement (Fourth) of
Foreign Relations Law § 313 reporters’ note 6 (Am. Law Inst. 2018) (observing that if “treaty
termination is a concurrent, rather than exclusive, power, it is possible that it could be limited
by the Senate in its advice and consent to a particular treaty, and possibly also by Congress
through statute”).
46
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438–39 (1998) (observing that “[t]here is no
provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal
statutes” and striking down as unconstitutional a statute delegating power to the President to
cancel certain portions of a statute after it had become law). See generally David J. Barron &
Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 265 (2013) (noting that
Congress frequently delegates to the President the authority to waive portions of a statute).
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U[nited] States, to be the supreme law of the land, it is understood that an
act of the legislature alone can declare them infringed and rescinded.”47
Recently Harold Koh has called for a “commonsense ‘mirror principle,’
whereby absent exceptional circumstances, the degree of congressional
participation constitutionally required to exit any particular agreement
should mirror the degree of congressional participation that was required
to enter that agreement in the first place.”48 Koh argues that “[a]s a
functional matter, an overbroad unilateral executive withdrawal power
would not only risk overly hasty, partisan, or parochial withdrawals by
Presidents, but would also tend to weaken systemic stability and the
negotiating credibility and leverage of all Presidents.”49
Those who consider that, when done in accordance with international
law, the President has the power to withdraw from a treaty point out that
the prior act of ratification is entirely at the President’s discretion (unlike
for statutes, where the veto can be overridden).50 They may also note that
the Framers appeared more concerned with foreign entanglement than its
opposite,51 that the President’s ability to threaten exit may facilitate
renegotiation and improve compliance in ways that advance U.S.
interests,52 and more generally that requiring a congressional statute or a
two-thirds resolution from the Senate could choke the ability of the United

47

Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of the Senate of the
United States 98 (U.S. Gov’t. Printing Office 1993) (1801), https://perma.cc/97XX-3EGP; see
also Barry M. Goldwater, Treaty Termination Is a Shared Power, 65 A.B.A. J. 198, 199–200
(1979) (citing this in making an argument against unilateral presidential withdrawal).
48
Koh, supra note 9, at 436; cf. id. at 452–55 (noting as a matter of comparative
constitutional law that legislative approval for treaty withdrawal is required in various other
countries). I discuss Koh’s argument here only in the context of treaties, but he also takes up
the termination of other kinds of international agreements.
49
Id. at 450.
50
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 313 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 2018)
(“[T]reaties are not fully analogous to legislation in their formation: most notably, unlike
statutes, treaties can never take effect for the United States unless approved by the President.”).
As a structural matter, proponents of unilateral presidential termination sometimes draw
parallels to the Appointments Clause, as the advice and consent of the Senate is also required
for appointments and the President’s authority to terminate an appointment is well-established.
See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 Va. J. Int’l
L. 247, 250–51 & n.3, 275–86 (2013) (citing commentary on this issue and building on the
analogy still further).
51
Henkin, supra note 43, at 212.
52
Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 773, 823
(2014).
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States to respond deftly and appropriately to developments on the world
stage.53
As a matter of both practice and mainstream wisdom, these latter
arguments currently prevail. As Curtis Bradley has documented, in the
nineteenth century treaty termination was generally taken to require
Congress or the Senate as well as the President, but practice started
shifting towards unilateral presidential termination starting around
1910.54 By the time President Carter invoked the withdrawal provision of
the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan—a controversial decision that
sparked constitutional concern among Senators and scholars—the
executive branch could point to a handful of prior unilateral
terminations.55 In Goldwater v. Carter, the Supreme Court deemed the
issue non-justiciable and therefore declined to intervene in the
termination.56 Since then, “the United States has terminated dozens of
treaties, and almost all of these terminations have been accomplished by
unilateral presidential action.”57 Both the Restatement (Third) and the
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law consider that the
President has the authority as a matter of constitutional law to withdraw
the United States from treaties, provided this withdrawal is consistent
with international law.58
The shift to unilateral presidential power has been smoothed by the fact
that, so far, Presidents have typically been sensible in their uses of it. Most
of the withdrawals to date have been low-profile and non-controversial.
The most significant one—the withdrawal from the Taiwan treaty—was

53

Henkin, supra note 43, at 212.
Bradley, supra note 52, at 788–810 (discussing practice leading up to President Carter’s
termination of the Taiwan treaty); see also Jean Galbraith, Treaty Termination as Foreign
Affairs Exceptionalism, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 121, 126 (2014) (situating this shift within a broader
narrative of rising presidential powers in the first half of the twentieth century).
55
Bradley, supra note 52, at 811–14 (discussing the controversy and the role that practice
played in the debates).
56
444 U.S. 996, 997, 1002 (1979) (dismissing the case without a controlling opinion, as a
plurality of four justices deemed the case to present a political question and Justice Powell
found the issue not ripe for review).
57
Bradley, supra note 52, at 814.
58
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 313 (Am. Law Inst. 2018) (“According
to established practice, the President has the authority to act on behalf of the United
States . . . in withdrawing the United States from treaties [where permitted by international
law].”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 339 (Am. Law Inst. 1987) (“Under
the law of the United States, the President has the power . . . to suspend or terminate an
agreement in accordance with its terms.”).
54
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accepted by Carter’s successor and has withstood the test of history.59
Other notable withdrawals include President George W. Bush’s decision
to withdraw the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with
Russia60 and decisions by the Reagan administration and the George W.
Bush administration to withdraw the United States from treaty
commitments accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”).61 These choices have been controversial, but they have
not upended the world order or triggered robust conversations about
rejoining to date. The Trump administration has not yet announced treaty
withdrawals that are more dramatic than those announced by the George
W. Bush administration. But the prospect remains. Here, as in many other
areas, the Trump administration makes acutely salient how legal rules
designed to provide flexibility to reasonable actors can also provide
opportunities to erratic ones.62
II. REJOINING TREATIES—CAN IT BE DONE WITHOUT RETURNING TO
THE SENATE?
Unlike for treaty formation and treaty withdrawal, the domestic legal
process required for treaty rejoining has received no sustained attention
in scholarship or the public sphere. This fact is reassuring rather than
surprising. There have been only a few controversial withdrawals by
presidents, and none have been so problematic as to trigger serious
conversations about the constitutional process for rejoining. But the tea
leaves suggest that this equilibrium may shift, which in turn makes it time
to consider whether a President may rejoin the United States to a treaty
without returning to the Senate for as second round of advice and consent.
59

See supra note 1.
Bradley, supra note 52, at 815–16.
61
Letter from George P. Shultz, Sec’y of State to U.N. Sec’y-Gen. (Oct. 7, 1985), in 24
I.L.M. 1742 (1985) (withdrawing the U.S. acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction, which it had
generally accepted in 1946 pursuant to a declaration under article 36 of the U.N. Charter);
U.N. Treaty Collection, Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, https://perma.cc/PC6G-GHH9
(recording, in n.1, the U.S. letter of March 7, 2005, giving notice of its withdrawal from this
Protocol).
62
Cf. W. Neil Eggleston & Amanda Elbogen, The Trump Administration and the
Breakdown of Intra-Executive Legal Process, 127 Yale L.J. F. 825, 847 (2018) (describing
how difficulties can arise when “a President wakes up one morning and decides to change a
policy by tweet without involving [the] extensive apparatus” of “a full array of experts at the
National Security Council, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and other agencies”).
60
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This Part takes up this fascinating doctrinal question. Drawing on text,
related practice, structure, and function, it determines that, as a general
rule, the President can rejoin a treaty without further advice and consent.
It then discusses several important limits on this general rule. It ends by
describing the practical significance of the conclusions reached here.
A. Treaty Rejoining as a Matter of Doctrine
The President would not need to return to the Senate for another round
of advice and consent to rejoin a treaty if the Senate’s initial resolution of
advice and consent was sufficient for rejoining as a matter of law. For this
to be the case, two further propositions in turn would need to be satisfied.
The first is that, as a constitutional matter, an initial resolution of advice
and consent could serve as advice and consent for rejoining after a
unilateral presidential withdrawal. The second is that, as a matter of their
interpretation, existing Senate resolutions of advice and consent do in fact
serve as such. In what follows, I argue that the first proposition is correct
and that the second proposition is presumptively correct. I take each
proposition in turn, although there is some overlap in the justifications.
1. The Senate’s Constitutional Authority to Authorize Rejoining
Before determining whether existing resolutions of advice and consent
do authorize rejoining, it is important to address whether they can do so
as a matter of constitutional law. To put it in a different way, suppose that
the Senate attached a condition to a resolution of advice and consent that
stated: “This resolution of advice and consent further authorizes the
rejoining of this treaty subsequent to a withdrawal undertaken unilaterally
by the executive branch.” Under this circumstance, we would have no
doubt that the Senate had authorized rejoining, but we would still have to
consider whether it falls within the constitutional scope of the Senate’s
advice and consent power to authorize not only joining but rejoining. Can
the Senate authorize rejoining, or does withdrawal from a treaty have the
effect of obligating the political branches to start from scratch?
The text of the Treaty Clause is indeterminate on this question, just as
it is indeterminate on when advice and consent should occur in the process
of joining a treaty; on whether the Senate’s advice and consent can
include reservations, understandings, declarations and conditions; and on
the circumstances under which the President can unilaterally withdraw
the United States from a treaty. We can get only so much from “[the
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President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.”63 This text is an example of how the “nature [of the
Constitution], therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be
marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves.”64 In its most recent major case on the separation of foreign
affairs powers, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of
historical practice and structural principles as additional tools of
constitutional interpretation.65 These tools readily support the conclusion
that the Senate has the constitutional authority to authorize rejoining a
treaty as part of its initial resolution of advice and consent.
Although there is no historical practice either way on the specific issue
of rejoining, historical practice under the Treaty Clause more generally
supports broad flexibility for the President and the Senate. As discussed
earlier, this practice makes clear that a Senate resolution of advice and
consent can remain operative for years or decades, long after the end of
the session in which it is passed.66 Practice under the Treaty Clause also
includes forward-looking resolutions focused on future contingencies. In
practice that dates back to the Washington administration, for example,
the Senate has sometimes conditioned its advice and consent on the
renegotiation of certain treaty terms.67 Upon obtaining these renegotiated

63
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Even with this scant text, however, it is notable that the
“advice and consent” modifies not the actual making of the treaties, but rather simply the
President’s “power” to make them. See Galbraith, supra note 12, at 264 (making this point).
This in turn suggests that the Senate’s advice and consent need not be narrowly tailored to the
specific treaty and moment at hand, but rather can cover longer-term authorizations akin to
delegations. Id.
64
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
65
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (looking to the “Constitution’s text
and structure, as well as precedent and history” to determine whether the power of recognizing
foreign nations is exclusive to the President or shared concurrently with Congress). Zivotofsky
notes the significance of precedent, but unsurprisingly there is an absence of precedent
relevant to the rejoining of treaties.
66
See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text; see also supra note 20 (observing that
practice also demonstrates flexibility with respect to the ordering of the steps of treatymaking).
67
Galbraith, supra note 12, at 261–63 (discussing several examples of this practice during
the Washington administration). For a more recent example, see 124 Cong. Rec. 7187–88
(1978) (containing the Senate’s advice and consent to the Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty,
which was made conditional on the executive branch obtaining two amendments to the text of
the treaty).
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terms, presidents have felt themselves free to ratify the treaties without
further advice and consent.68 This practice demonstrates that Senate
resolutions of advice and consent are constitutionally permitted to have
long time horizons and to be contingent on future developments—both
features that would be applicable to an initial resolution of advice and
consent that authorizes the rejoining of at treaty.
Indeed, treaty practice in the modern era now tacitly accepts that U.S.
treaty relations can be de-established and re-established without
subsequent rounds of Senate advice and consent. At the international
level, the rise of multilateral treaties has radically changed treaty practice
since the Founding. For almost all multilateral treaties, the Senate does
not specifically approve the formation of treaty relations between the
United States and particular other countries.69 Rather, the Senate advises
and consents to U.S. entry into a multilateral treaty with an awareness of
what other countries are authorized to join that treaty pursuant to its own
terms and of which of these countries have already joined it, but without
certainty as to which of the other authorized countries will or will not join
in the future. (The process would be unworkable otherwise.) On occasion,
another country will join the treaty, then exit it, and then rejoin it. By way
of example, since the United States joined the Whaling Convention,
eleven other countries have joined, exited, and rejoined—Belize, Brazil,
Dominica, Ecuador, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Panama, Sweden, and Uruguay.70 When this occurs, the U.S. treaty
68

Galbraith, supra note 12, at 261–63 (discussing the precedent established in the
Washington administration); see also J. Reuben Clark, Jr. et al., Solicitor’s Opinion of August
5, 1911, in Dep’t of State, Lettering for Solicitor’s Opinions, Part 2, at 33–34 (1911) (on file
with author) (noting that when the Senate conditions its advice and consent on future
amendments to a treaty, this effectively “constitutes the negotiation of a new treaty” but that
“it is unnecessary to submit the treaty again for [the Senate’s] advise [sic] and consent when
finally drawn”).
69
See CRS Report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supra note 20, at 154
(noting how this shift has affected practice with respect to reservations made by treaty partners
in multilateral treaties). An exception is the North Atlantic Treaty, where President Truman
committed that the United States would deem the admission of every new member (beyond
the initial signatories) “as the conclusion of a new treaty with that member and would seek the
advice and consent of the Senate to each such admission.” S. Exec. Rep. No. 81-8, at 18 (1949)
(further noting that the “committee considers this an obligation binding upon the Presidential
office”); see also Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation 285 (1969) (discussing this
presidential commitment).
70
Dep’t of State, Status of International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (May
22, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/20180530212930/https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/191051.pdf (also noting that Costa Rica temporarily withdrew its adherence for
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relations with the country are severed and then re-established without
intervening action by the Senate. In these cases, of course, the withdrawal
is initiated and effected not by the President but by the other country, and
typically the President will not have control over that country’s ability to
reenter.71 This practice nonetheless makes clear that the treaty relations
can be—and have been—re-established without further proceedings from
the Senate following the termination of these relations between the United
States and other countries.72
Practice with respect to international agreements other than treaties
also provides strong support for the conclusion that the Senate can
authorize the rejoining of a treaty as well as the joining of it. In the years
since the Founding, the United States has come to make many
international agreements through domestic law procedures other than
those specified in the Treaty Clause. International agreements are now
most commonly done as ex ante congressional-executive agreements,
where Congress passes statutes authorizing or otherwise signaling support
for executive branch officials to enter into future international agreements
domestic legal reasons). The Netherlands has twice exited and twice rejoined. Id. The Senate
advised and consented to the Whaling Convention on July 2, 1947, see 93 Cong. Rec. 8080–
81 (1947), and the United States ratified it on July 18, 1947, see Status of International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra. As another example, subsequent to the U.S.
ratification of the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Senegal
withdrew from and later rejoined this treaty. See U.N. Food & Agric. Org., International
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, https://perma.cc/NV4Q-39HQ (last
updated June 26, 2019) (containing depository information); see also 113 Cong. Rec. 4915
(1967) (containing the Senate’s advice and consent to this treaty).
71
There are some treaties that give existing treaty members a say over new members, which
might provide the President with a mechanism for blocking another country from rejoining.
Under the U.N. Charter, for example, any permanent member of the Security Council
(including the United States) can veto an applicant for new membership. See U.N. Charter
arts. 4, 27. As a formalist matter, however, to date no nation has been deemed to have
withdrawn from and then sought to rejoin the United Nations. See Egon Schwelb, Withdrawal
from the United Nations: The Indonesia Intermezzo, 61 Am. J. Int’l L. 661, 665–69, 671
(1967) (describing how this issue was finessed with respect to Indonesia in the mid-1960s).
72
A related strand of practice has to do with state succession. In past practice, the executive
branch has often deemed an existing treaty to apply to a state successor to the original other
treaty party without returning to the Senate for a second round of advice and consent. With
the fall of the Soviet Union, for example, the executive branch presumptively viewed existing
Senate-approved treaties as continuing in force between the United States and the successor
states to the Soviet Union. See Edwin D. Williamson & John E. Osborn, A U.S. Perspective
on Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the Wake of the Breakup of the USSR and
Yugoslavia, 33 Va. J. Int’l L. 261, 264–65 (1993) (explaining that “[i]n sum, while we
recognized that the law in this area is somewhat unsettled, we decided that the better legal
position was to presume continuity in treaty relations”).
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on particular topics.73 For such agreements, the executive branch takes the
congressional authorization not merely to apply to the creation of an
initial agreement, but also to later renegotiations.74
In addition, some international agreements are done as ex post
congressional-executive agreements, where Congress legislates in
support of the agreement after it has been fully negotiated.75 On at least
two occasions, the executive branch has withdrawn from an ex post
congressional-executive agreement and then rejoined it without returning
to Congress for further approval. In one of these instances, President Ford
withdrew the United States from the international agreement underlying
the International Labor Organization in 1975, and President Carter then
rejoined the United States to it in 1980.76 In the other instance, President
Reagan withdrew the United States from the international agreement
underlying UNESCO in 1984, and President George W. Bush rejoined it
in 2003.77 (The Trump administration has now withdrawn the United
States yet again from UNESCO.78) Both of these rejoinings were with
respect to multilateral international agreements that set up international
organizations.79 If such pre-authorizations are constitutionally
73
See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the
Balance, 119 Yale L.J. 140, 155–67 (2009) (discussing ex ante congressional-executive
agreements in detail).
74
To give just one example, an ex ante congressional-executive agreement with Mexico
regarding screwworm eradication was made in 1972, see Screwworm Eradication Program,
U.S.-Mex., Aug. 28, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2467–68, and then amended without intervening
congressional action in 1990, see Amending the Agreement of August 28, 1972, U.S.-Mex.,
Dec. 7, 1990, T.I.A.S. 12427. The congressional statutes that give rise to ex ante
congressional-executive agreements effectively operate as delegations to the executive
branch.
It is worth noting that some international agreements, known as sole executive agreements,
do not involve Congress. For these agreements, it is self-evident that the executive branch
should be able to rejoin them as a matter of domestic law following withdrawal.
75
See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev.
799, 897–907 (1995) (describing uses of such agreements in the years after World War II).
76
Bradley, supra note 17, at 1639.
77
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, United States
Gives Notice of Withdrawal from UNESCO, Citing Anti-Israel Bias, 112 Am. J. Int’l L. 107
(Jean Galbraith ed., 2018) (describing the withdrawal from UNESCO by the Reagan
administration and its rejoining by the George W. Bush administration).
78
Id. (noting that the requisite one-year notice of withdrawal was given in 2017).
79
There is no reason to think that U.S. constitutional practice with respect to rejoining
should be different for international agreements establishing international organizations than
for other kinds of international agreements. As a matter of international law there are some
differences between treaties setting up international organizations and other kinds of
multilateral treaties. With regard to joining, however, these differences run in the direction of
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permissible with respect to these alternative pathways for making
international agreements, then it would be strange, to say the least, to
deem a similar approach constitutionally foreclosed under the Treaty
Clause process, which the Framers intended to make the primary vehicle
for international commitments.
Structural considerations also favor the conclusion that the Senate may
authorize rejoining as a constitutional matter. The concept of checks and
balances lies at the heart of our constitutional system. Under the current
practice, a President can unilaterally withdraw the United States from a
treaty pursuant to its terms—and thus unmake a “supreme law of the land”
that was made initially not just with presidential authority but also with a
bipartisan super-majority of the Senate. To hold, as a constitutional
matter, that the Senate may not authorize rejoining would be to enhance
the reach of this unchecked power of withdrawal. By contrast, if the
Senate can authorize rejoining, then it has available to it a tool that can
blunt the long-term impact of the unilateral presidential power of
withdrawal.
Collectively, these reasons readily support the conclusion that
withdrawal from a treaty does not necessarily obligate the political
branches to start from scratch under the Treaty Clause. This is not a hard
constitutional question—and therefore not one that should trigger the
canon of constitutional avoidance with respect to how to interpret existing
resolutions. Rather, the text of the Treaty Clause, related practice, and
structural considerations all support the conclusion that an initial Senate
resolution of advice and consent can, as a constitutional matter, apply to
the rejoining of a treaty as well as to the initial joining of it.
It is worth noting that these reasons are specific to the Treaty Clause
and do not justify a comparable conclusion with respect to the
Appointments Clause. While the two clauses are often read in parallel, the
text of the Treaty Clause is far more flexible than the Appointments
Clause. It does not specify how the “mak[ing]” of treaties shall occur or
when, as a matter of timing, the Senate’s advice and consent shall occur
in the treaty-making process, whereas the Appointments Clause makes
being more restrictive for treaties setting up international organizations. Customary
international law with regard to state succession, for example, has been understood by U.S.
executive branch lawyers to be narrower with respect to membership in international
organizations due to “the fact that membership in an international organization creates
multiple rights and obligations that extend beyond the comparatively limited and explicit
obligations found in most treaties.” Williamson & Osborn, supra note 72, at 267.
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clear that advice and consent must come between nomination and
appointment, suggesting that a fresh nomination would trigger a fresh
need for advice and consent.80 Moreover the practice under the
Appointments Clause does not support the long time horizons for advice
and consent that exist under the Treaty Clause,81 and structural concerns
about the effect of unilateral presidential power of termination are less
significant for appointments, which are by nature transient for executive
branch officials, than they are for treaties, which are the supreme law of
the land. For appointments, therefore, the extent to which the Senate can
delegate power, make decisions that will bear fruit only many years
hence, and attach conditions is limited—or, at best, a difficult
constitutional question. For treaties, by contrast, the authority of the
Senate easily extends to advising and consenting to the future rejoining
of treaties.
2. Existing Resolutions as Authorizations to Rejoin
Unsurprisingly, as a matter of practice Senate resolutions of advice and
consent have no specific language regarding their applicability for
purposes of rejoining treaties. They do not say “this advice and consent
remains available for purposes of rejoining the treaty” nor do they say
“this advice and consent is applicable only for the initial joining of a treaty
and not for any subsequent rejoining.” So, should we read these
resolutions to apply to the rejoining of treaties as a matter of domestic
law? This is a matter of statutory interpretation—or, more accurately,
resolution interpretation. I argue here that these resolutions presumptively
authorize rejoining as a matter of domestic law. As with joining, rejoining

80

Compare U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President “shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur”), with id. (providing that the President “shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint” officers of the United States).
81
The Standing Rules of the Senate draw these distinctions sharply as a matter of practice.
If a treaty has not gone through the advice and consent process during one congressional term,
it remains pending for consideration during the next congressional term (although it must go
back to the beginning of the committee consideration process). See Standing Rules of the
Senate, S. Doc. No. 113-18, R. XXX(2) (2013). By contrast, nominations do not remain
pending before the Senate from session to session and from term to term; rather,
“[n]ominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which they are made shall
not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being again made to the Senate by the
President.” Id. XXXI(6).
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would be of course subject to whatever reservations, understandings,
declarations and conditions are set forth in the resolution.
Although Senate resolutions have no specific language with respect to
rejoining, that does not mean that the text is silent on this issue. As noted
earlier, a typical Senate resolution expresses the Senate’s advice and
consent to the joining of a particular treaty. By way of example: “Resolved
(two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein)” that the “Senate
advises and consents to the ratification of the Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, concluded
on May 14, 1954 (Treaty Doc. 106-1(A)), subject to the
understandings . . . and the declaration [that follow].”82 On its face, the
text provides consent to ratification, clearly identifies the treaty at issue,
and sets forth some understandings and declarations (that are irrelevant to
the issue of rejoining). As long as the President is ratifying this treaty in
keeping with these understandings and the declaration, then he or she is
acting consistent with the plain text of this treaty—whether or not it is an
initial ratification or a subsequent one.83
This approach to plain language has been applied by the executive
branch in the closely related context of ex post congressional-executive
agreements. As noted earlier, the United States joined, exited, and then
rejoined UNESCO and the International Labour Organization (“ILO”)
pursuant to pre-existing congressional authorizations. With respect to
UNESCO, for example, in 1946 Congress passed a law providing that
[T]he President is hereby authorized to accept membership for the
United States in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization . . . , the constitution of which was approved in
London on November 16, 1945, by the United Nations Conference for
the establishment of an Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization, and deposited in the Archives of the Government of the
United Kingdom.84

As with Senate resolutions, this law provides consent to joining, clearly
identifies the international agreement at issue, and has no specific
82

154 Cong. Rec. 21,776 (2008). This is another example of a treaty that took the United
States a long time to join.
83
I return later to the important issue of how to understand the word “ratification” in relation
to the international legal process for joining and rejoining multilateral treaties. See infra
Subsection II.B.2.
84
Pub. L. No. 79-565, 60 Stat. 712 (1946) (codified at 22 U.S.C § 287m (2012)); see also
22 U.S.C § 271 (2012) (using similar language with respect to the ILO).
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language going either way on the issue of rejoining. When the George W.
Bush administration rejoined UNESCO in 2003, it must have interpreted
this language not as a one-time permission, but rather as a continuing
authorization to choose to join UNESCO.85
There is no reason to take a different approach for interpreting Senate
resolutions of advice and consent.86 The Senate presumably advises and
consents to treaties because it wants the United States to become a party
to these treaties. Interpreting a Senate resolution of advice and consent to
authorize the rejoining of a treaty advances this underlying purpose.
In light of the practical unimportance of rejoining to date, we are
unlikely to have specific evidence of whether Senators thought that a
resolution to which they were advising and consenting would authorize
the rejoining of a treaty as well as the initial joining of it. Indeed, at least
prior to President Carter’s termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan, some or most Senators would likely have assumed that treaty
withdrawal would require Senate approval.87 We thus cannot do more
than speculate with respect to the issue of rejoining. But it does seem
plausible that Senators who oppose a unilateral presidential power to
withdraw from treaties would prefer that such a power, given its existence
in practice, be coupled with a presidential power to rejoin treaties. It also
seems plausible that Senators who approve of the unilateral presidential
85
The Bush administration announcement rejoining UNESCO did not discuss the statutory
basis for rejoining. See U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States Rejoins UNESCO (Sept. 22,
2003), https://perma.cc/ZJ74-TRL9; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 25(1)–(2), opened for signature June 4, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
86
The usefulness of this related practice is especially valuable where, as here, there is likely
to be no legislative history that sheds light on how to interpret Senate resolutions of advice
and consent with respect to rejoining. Before President Carter’s withdrawal from the mutual
defense treaty with Taiwan, the Senate paid virtually no attention to the predicate issue of
unilateral treaty withdrawal, and I am unaware of any attention paid by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee or other actors in the Senate to the legal process for rejoining. Even the
293-page report on the treaty-making process produced in 2001 for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee by the Congressional Research Service is silent on this issue. See
generally CRS Report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supra note 20 (not
addressing the issue of rejoining).
87
After Carter’s decision, a large number of Senators signaled their view that Senate
approval was required for withdrawal from the mutual defense treaty. While the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee advanced a resolution that supported the President’s legal
authority, the Senate voted 59-35 to substitute this resolution for one providing that it was “the
sense of the Senate that approval of the United States Senate is required to terminate any
mutual defense treaty between the United States and another nation.” Bradley, supra note 52,
at 811–12 (quoting S. Res. 15, 96th Cong. (1979)) (noting that the Senate never ultimately
voted on the substituted resolution).
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power to withdraw from treaties in light of the added flexibility conveyed
by that power would also approve of a presidential power to rejoin treaties
in light of the added flexibility conveyed by that power.
It is true that the rejoining may occur many years after the original
Senate resolution of advice and consent and at a time when two-thirds of
the current Senate might not desire re-entry into the treaty at issue. But
this can also be true with respect to the initial joining of treaties, which
can occur long after the Senate has given its advice and consent. Indeed,
as between (1) a treaty that the United States initially joins many years
after the Senate’s advice and consent and (2) a treaty that the United States
initially joins immediately after the Senate’s advice and consent but that
the President unilaterally withdraws from many years later, the case may
well be stronger for rejoining the latter treaty than for joining the first one.
When a President rejoins the United States to a long-standing treaty, that
President returns the United States to a status quo that had earlier received
the approval of both a prior President and two-thirds of the Senate.
Finally, interpreting the Senate resolutions of advice and consent to
authorize rejoining avoids structural concerns. Unilateral presidential
withdrawal from treaties is justified on the grounds that the President
previously had unilateral discretion to ratify, and that it provides useful
flexibility for the advancement of U.S. foreign policy interests.88 Yet it
also carries the risk of abuse, and it is particularly problematic to the
extent that presidential withdrawal is taken to nullify the actions of the
Senate, a separate and coordinate branch. This concern is alleviated by
interpreting Senate resolutions to apply to rejoining treaties. It cabins the
President’s withdrawal power to just that—withdrawal—rather than
giving the President the further unilateral power to force the process back
to square one. If withdrawal is justifiable on the grounds that ratification

88
For those treaties with withdrawal clauses, another justification offered is that the Senate
knew about a withdrawal clause in a treaty when advising and consenting to a treaty—and
therefore somehow impliedly accepted that the executive branch has the power to be the actor
within the U.S. government who can trigger that withdrawal clause. See Goldwater v. Carter,
617 F.2d 697, 708 (1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (arguing that “the President’s
authority as Chief Executive is at its zenith when the Senate has consented to a treaty that
expressly provides for termination on one year’s notice, and the President’s action is the giving
of notice of termination”). An analogous although not precisely similar logic could be offered
with respect to rejoining treaties. Although treaties typically do not have clauses specific to
rejoining, they always have clauses about how the treaty is to be joined—and these clauses
are presumably known to the Senate. To the extent that rejoining falls under the broader
category of joining, the treaty itself thus provides for it.
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lies with the President and that flexibility is crucial as a functional matter,
then rejoining should be justifiable for precisely these same reasons.
In general, the effect of rejoining will be to restore the United States to
the status quo that existed prior to exit. For some treaties, however,
rejoining may have the effect of causing the United States to make
international commitments with respect to timing that are greater than
they were at the time of exit. This is because some treaties require entering
parties to commit to an initial period of years before they can withdraw.
The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, for example,
provides that a party must give one year of notice of withdrawal and that
it cannot give this notice within the first three years “from the date on
which the Convention has entered into force for a Party.”89 As another
example, when the Senate advised and consented to U.S. acceptance to
the general jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, it did so with
the condition that this acceptance would “remain in force for a period of
five years and thereafter until the expiration of six months after notice
may be given to terminate” the acceptance.90 Assuming these provisions
are measured by the date of rejoining rather than backdated to the initial
joining—an issue on which practice is absent—then the commitment on
rejoining will be greater as a matter of time than was true at the time of
exit, although equivalent to the commitment made at the time the United
States initially joined the treaty.
As a practical matter, interpreting existing resolutions of advice and
consent to authorize rejoining may help preserve the future relevance of
the Treaty Clause. If the resolutions of ratification are not read to
authorize rejoining as a matter of domestic law, then a President who
wishes to rejoin faces a difficult choice. Should he or she return to the
Senate for another round of advice and consent or instead try to rejoin the
international agreement through another domestic legal pathway? As
mentioned earlier, it has become very difficult to get even slightly
controversial treaties through the Senate—and any treaty from which one
President withdraws the United States is likely to count as at least slightly
controversial. If the President cannot rejoin the treaty on the basis of the
prior resolution of advice and consent, then he or she will be strongly
incentivized to pursue other domestic pathways for joining it, such as
seeking ex post congressional-executive approval or perhaps by simply
89

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 25(1)–(2), opened for
signature June 4, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
90
S. Exec. Journal, 79th Cong., 2d. Sess. 719–20 (1946).
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relying on sole executive powers or on language in a pre-existing statute.
By contrast, interpreting existing resolutions of advice and consent to
authorize rejoining not only places a check on the withdrawing President,
but also provides later presidents with incentives to continue to act under
the Treaty Clause, which contains the one process for making
international agreements that is specifically set forth in the Constitution.
B. Limiting Situations
Assuming the Senate’s original resolution of advice and consent
presumptively authorizes rejoining a treaty and the President wishes to
rejoin this treaty, there may still be legal or practical barriers to rejoining.
Broadly speaking, there are three types of potential barriers. The first is
that either Congress or two-thirds of the Senate has expressly or impliedly
repealed the Senate’s original advice and consent. The second is that the
President is unable as a matter of international relations or international
law to rejoin the treaty, or at least unable to rejoin it in a manner consistent
with the Senate’s original resolution of advice and consent. The third is
that intervening changes in U.S. law may limit the implementation of the
treaty, which in turn can affect whether and when the United States rejoins
it. In what follows, I discuss each of these potential barriers in turn.
1. The Senate Resolution Is No Longer Legally Operative
I have argued that, as a general matter, Senate resolutions authorize
rejoining as well as joining. But before relying on a particular Senate
resolution of advice and consent, the executive branch must undertake a
case-specific inquiry into whether this resolution does in fact remain
legally operative. The original resolution is unlikely to contain an order
for its own self-destruction,91 but it would need to be reviewed as a matter
of due diligence. The more likely basis of concern—though still
infrequent—is that the Senate or Congress will have taken some
subsequent action that expressly or impliedly negates the original
resolution of advice and consent.

91

It is not the practice for Senate resolutions of advice and consent to contain sunset clauses
with respect to their own lifespan, and I am unaware of any resolutions that do so. A more
frequent source of concern, which I discuss in the next Subsection, is that the international
legal process needed to rejoin the treaty might not be precisely the same as the international
legal process specified in the resolution of ratification.
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On rare occasions, the Senate has reconsidered a resolution of advice
and consent or itself approved the President’s decision to withdraw from
a treaty. In 1874, for example, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution
stating that its resolution from several weeks earlier giving advice and
consent to an extradition treaty was “hereby, reconsidered, and that the
President [was] requested to return the said convention and resolution to
the Senate.”92 With respect to authorizing withdrawal, in 1921 the Senate
advised and consented by a two-thirds majority to U.S. withdrawal from
the International Sanitary Convention.93 Where the Senate takes such
actions, it is effectively repealing its own resolution of advice and
consent. In such situations, the President would need to obtain afresh the
advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate to rejoin a treaty pursuant
to the Treaty Clause.
More common than subsequent action by the Senate—though still
fairly uncommon—is subsequent congressional legislation that
effectively invalidates a Senate resolution of advice and consent. Treaties
and statutes are understood to have equal status as the “supreme Law of
the Land” under the Supremacy Clause, and under the “last-in-time rule”
a subsequent statute will supersede a prior treaty as a matter of domestic
law.94 Sometimes Congress legislates in favor of withdrawal from a
treaty, as with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which
directed the Secretary of State to “terminate immediately” a tax treaty
92

S. Exec. Journal, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. 289 (1874). This resolution itself was subsequently
rescinded two days later. Id. at 291; see also Crandall, supra note 33, at 74 (describing this
incident). Some have suggested that rescission of advice and consent cannot occur once the
resolution has been transmitted to the President. See CRS Report for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, supra note 20, at 143. But see Henkin, supra note 43, at 179 (“There is
no authoritative decision or precedent on the question, but the Senate can probably withdraw,
modify, or impose conditions on consent it had given, before the President concludes the
treaty.”). I think Louis Henkin is correct on this point and therefore that the President may not
rejoin a treaty on the basis of the original resolution if two-thirds of the Senate has passed an
intervening resolution retracting this resolution.
93
Bradley, supra note 52, at 794 (noting that this is one of two known examples whereby
the Senate advised and consented to withdrawal, as distinct from legislative action undertaken
by Congress as a whole); see also 61 Cong. Rec. 1793 (1921) (providing the text of the
resolution).
94
U.S. Const. art. VI; Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870) (“A treaty
may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.”
(citation omitted)). The Supreme Court has not addressed a situation where the conflicting
statute is passed between the Senate’s advice and consent and the treaty’s entry into force. Cf.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 115 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1986) (noting
various questions related to timing). For a treaty to supersede a statute as a matter of domestic
law, it must be self-executing, see id., which many multilateral treaties are not.
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between the United States and South Africa.95 Such a law should be taken
to amount to a repeal of the Senate’s original advice and consent, and the
President would need new approval for the Senate in order to rejoin the
treaty.
More subtle congressional enactments present more difficult legal
questions. What if, after the treaty withdrawal, Congress legislates in a
manner that appears to rely on this withdrawal? Consider the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979, which was effectively premised on the withdrawal
of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan and the recognition of
mainland China, but which did not endorse these actions.96 Given this and
subsequent legislation premised on normalized relations with mainland
China and non-treaty relations with Taiwan, could the President today just
rejoin the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan (after re-recognizing Taiwan
as “China”)? This is the kind of issue that, as a legal matter, would require
close and case-specific analysis to determine whether the intervening
congressional legislation rises to the level of an implied repeal of the
treaty or of the Senate’s original advice and consent to it. It is also the
kind of issue where, law aside, the President is highly unlikely to have
any interest in revisiting the current status quo.97
2. International Relations or International Law Makes the Senate
Resolution No Longer Usable
A second set of limitations on rejoining treaties may arise from
international relations or international law. In practice, these are the
limitations that a President who wishes to rejoin a treaty will most
commonly encounter. For issues of international relations, how
surmountable these limitations are will turn on the attitudes of treaty
partners. For issues of international law, the import of these limits will
depend on how willing executive branch lawyers are to view international
legal practice capaciously or to read the language of Senate resolutions of
advice and consent broadly.
95

Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 313, 100 Stat. 1086,
1104 (repealed 1993).
96
See generally Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 3301–3316 (2012)) (outlining relations between the United States and Taiwan).
97
As a matter of constitutional law, as established in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076,
2094 (2015), the President has the exclusive power to decide whether to recognize Taiwan or
mainland China as “China.” In practice, however, geopolitical shifts since 1979 make it highly
unlikely that a President would return to recognizing Taiwan as “China,” which in turn would
be a precondition for rejoining the mutual defense treaty.
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As a matter of international relations, rejoining a bilateral treaty is
likely to be harder than rejoining a multilateral treaty. Bilateral relations
likely have greater variation over time than multilateral relations, which
in turn reduces the likelihood that both states will wish to revive an old
treaty. President Trump’s successor is very unlikely to want to rejoin the
1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights with
Iran, which had been “defunct de facto for decades” even before the
Trump administration formally triggered withdrawal.98 President
Trump’s withdrawal from an important arms control treaty with Russia—
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—came following years of
Russian non-compliance with the treaty,99 and it therefore seems unlikely
that Russia would be willing to rejoin the treaty in good faith and comply
with the obligations set forth in it. Even where the bilateral relationship
and the interest in the treaty’s subject matter has remained relatively
stable, the negotiation of an updated treaty might be more appealing than
rejoining the original one. On average, bilateral treaties are easier to
renegotiate than are multilateral treaties—since they involve only one
other party—and have better prospects of getting through the Senate.100
For multilateral treaties, by contrast, rejoining will typically be
smoother as a matter of international relations. Many multilateral treaties
are open to any country wishing to join, including most treaties that form
the bedrock of the global world order. If President Trump’s successor
wishes to rejoin the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, for example, then as a matter of international law
this can be done simply by providing the proper notification to the U.N.
Secretary-General.101 For a few crucial treaties, as discussed later,
rejoining might require the affirmative consent of state parties. As a
general rule, however, the President will have a straightforward path vis98

Chimène Keitner, What Are the Consequences of the Trump Administration’s Recent
Treaty Withdrawals?, Just Security (Oct. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/MP65-BTPG.
99
See Hilary Hurd & Elena Chachko, U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: The Facts and
the Law, Lawfare (Oct. 25, 2018, 11:03 AM), https://perma.cc/AS3C-LM7V (noting evidence
of Russian non-compliance since 2008). The United States officially provided Russia with the
requisite six months of notice of withdrawal in February 2019. Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of
State, U.S. Intent to Withdraw from the INF Treaty, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 2, 2019),
https://perma.cc/W2UT-7BHB.
100
Galbraith, supra note 12, at 248, 276 (noting that certain types of routine bilateral treaties
fare reasonably well in the Senate, unlike multilateral treaties and non-routine bilateral
treaties).
101
See Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations arts. 6–7, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
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à-vis other states with respect to rejoining treaties that are open to worldwide membership. And even in cases where the consent of treaty partners
to re-entry may be required, it will almost certainly be easier for the
President to rejoin a multilateral treaty than to try to negotiate a new
multilateral treaty and then obtain the advice and consent of the Senate to
this treaty.
Turning from international relations to international law, the latter also
sets some potential limits on rejoining treaties—and in particular on
rejoining them in a manner that is consistent with the text of the original
Senate resolution of advice and consent. How substantial these limits are
in practice will turn on how broadly or narrowly executive branch lawyers
either construe their options under international law or the scope of the
Senate resolutions of advice and consent. For the reasons I give below,
my view is that these limits are generally surmountable, but there is room
for disagreement.
As a matter of international law, if one party lawfully withdraws from
a bilateral treaty, then this treaty is terminated.102 The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties does not specify whether termination obligates the
parties to start the treaty-making process from scratch if they want to reinstitute the treaty.103 This is important because Senate resolutions of
advice and consent typically identify a treaty by the date of its signature.
If, as a matter of international law, the parties must sign the treaty anew,
then this will raise the question of whether the Senate’s advice and
consent applies to the newly signed treaty.104
In my view, the parties have potential avenues available for reinstituting the expired treaty without starting from scratch with new
102

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that the “termination of a
treaty . . . may take place . . . in conformity with the provisions of the treaty.” Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, art. 54. Termination clauses in U.S. bilateral
treaties typically specify that either party may terminate the treaty after appropriate notice is
given to the other party. E.g., Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights,
Iran-U.S., art. XXIII, Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899 (providing that either party
“may . . . terminate the present Treaty” subject to certain timing rules).
103
See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22 (discussing
termination and suspension of the operation of treaties). As noted supra note 22, the United
States is not a party to the Vienna Convention but regards many of its provisions as reflecting
customary international law.
104
There is a touch of practice on this question as well. See infra note 126 (describing an
occasion on which the President interpreted a Senate resolution of ratification to be applicable
to a later treaty that contained the identical text to the treaty to which the Senate had advised
and consented).
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signatures. One possibility, although without international legal precedent
as far as I am aware, would be to exchange new instruments of ratification
to the original treaty. It would be perfectly acceptable and probably more
natural as a matter of international legal process for them to do new
signatures, but the Vienna Convention does not require this approach. The
Vienna Convention does have a provision—Article 70—on what the
consequences of termination are as a matter of international law. But this
article does not provide that termination has the effect of erasing a treaty
signature. Instead, it simply states as relevant that “Unless the treaty
otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the termination of a
treaty . . . [r]eleases the parties from any obligation further to perform the
treaty.”105 There is no prohibition against relying on the original signature
for purposes of rejoining. And indeed Article 70 indicates that, whatever
the default rule is on the effect of termination, the parties are free to
“otherwise agree.”106 The United States and another country would
therefore be free to re-institute a bilateral treaty by simply by exchanging
new ratifications. In doing so, the executive branch would fully comply
with the plain language of the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent.
Another related possibility is that the parties could enter into a separate
international agreement providing for the resuscitation of the initial treaty.
This practice has analogies in the context of state succession.107 This
approach could only be justified as a matter of U.S. domestic law,
however, if the executive branch were to conclude that it had the
independent constitutional authority to make the separate international
agreement resuscitating the initial treaty. The more the separate
agreement is framed as procedural rather than substantive in nature, the
more easily the executive branch could conclude that it had such
authority. Thus, a separate agreement in which the parties agree that a
renewed exchange of ratifications of the prior treaty will have the effect
of resuscitating it might be more defensible than a separate agreement in

105

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, art. 70(1). Unless the parties
agreed otherwise, Article 70 would have the effect of removing the legal obligations that flow
from signature—namely, the obligation not to “defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty . . . pending the entry into force of the treaty,” see id. art. 18, but that is different from
undoing the fact of signature.
106
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, art. 70(1).
107
See, e.g., Andreas Zimmermann, State Succession in Respect of Treaties, in State
Practice Regarding State Succession and Issues of Recognition 80, 110 (Jan Klabbers et al.
eds., 1999) (describing examples from the break-up of Czechoslovakia and of Yugoslavia).
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which the parties state that they accept the substantive obligations
contained in the prior treaty.
A similar set of issues arises for multilateral treaties. As a matter of
international law, states typically join a multilateral treaty through either
ratification or accession, formerly known as adherence.108 (Joining can
also happen through definitive signature, acceptance, approval, or other
agreed means, but I focus for convenience on ratification and
accession.109) Ratification is typically done by states who have signed the
treaty, while accession is done by states who have not signed the treaty.110
Signature is a step with international legal significance, as it constitutes a
commitment not to “defeat the object and purpose of a treaty . . . pending
the entry into force of the treaty.”111 But the difference between

108

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, arts. 14–15. On the older
terminology, see Law of Treaties: Article 12. Accession, 29 Am. J. Int’l. L. (Supplement: Res.
Int’l L.) 812, 812–15 (1935) (stating that “adhesion,” “accession,” and “adherence” are “words
being using interchangeably in practice” although noting some variation on this front).
109
The Vienna Convention recognizes that signature can be sufficient for a state to join a
treaty when a specific set of conditions is met, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 22, art. 12, and that sometimes the “consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is
expressed by acceptance or approval under conditions similar to those which apply to
ratification.” Id. art. 14(2).
110
See id. arts. 14–15; see also U.N. Office of L. Affairs, Treaty Section, Handbook on Final
Clauses of Multilateral Treaties, at 35–41, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V3 (2003) [hereinafter Final
Clauses Handbook] (discussing this difference).
111
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, art. 18. This obligation persists
prior to entry into force unless the state “shall have made its intention clear not to become a
party to the treaty.” Id. Where such intention is made clear (as was done by the George W.
Bush administration with respect to the Rome Statute), it is sometimes referred to as
“unsigning.” See generally Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2061, 2061 & n.1,
2066, 2071–72 (2003) (discussing the consequences of signature and legitimacy of unsigning).
Technically, however, the Vienna Convention does not describe the signature as erased. In its
depository role for the Rome Statute, the U.N. Secretary-General’s office continues to list the
United States as a “signatory” but mentions in a footnote the U.S. communication making
clear its intention not to become a party. U.N. Treaty Collection, Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, https://perma.cc/4KME-EB5M (containing depository
information); see also Presentation & Discussion of the ASIL Task Force Report on U.S.
Policy Towards the International Criminal Court, 103 Am. Soc. Int’l. L. Proc. 311, 317 (2009)
(concluding, drawing upon the analysis of treaty expert Duncan Hollis, that while “the United
States no longer has any obligations to refrain from acts that would defeat the Rome Statute’s
object and purpose, it remains a Signatory to that treaty” and could “proceed to ratify the
treaty . . . if it so decided”). If the United States were to join the Rome Statute, it remains to
be seen whether the U.N. Secretary-General’s office would view that as a ratification or as an
accession. If the latter, it would support the conclusion that signature can remain meaningful
in determining whether ratification or accession is appropriate even where that signature no
longer carries international law obligations with it.
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ratification and accession is purely a matter of form and does not affect
the substantive obligations taken on by the state once the treaty enters into
force.112 It is nonetheless a difference, and one that can matter to the treaty
depository—the actor specified under the treaty to whom states are to
officially communicate decisions to join or withdraw from a treaty.113 In
1994, for example, the office of the U.N. Secretary General took the
position that, when the Secretary-General is acting as treaty depository,
“[n]ormally, an instrument of accession cannot be substituted for the
required instrument of ratification when the agreement has already been
signed by the plenipotentiary of the Government concerned, any more
than an instrument of ratification can be validly deposited if only an
instrument of accession is acceptable.”114
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has no provision that
expressly deals with rejoining treaties. It thus does not specify whether a
country that is originally a signatory to a treaty, then ratifies the treaty,
and then withdraws from the treaty should rejoin it through ratification or
accession. Nor is the specific treaty in question likely to address this issue,
though, if it does, this would answer the question.115 There is limited
practice on this issue. Some practice indicates that accession is
appropriate for the rejoining of a treaty by a country that originally ratified
a treaty but later withdrew from it, although there is at least a touch of
practice to support re-ratification.116
112

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”); Final Clauses
Handbook, supra note 110, at 37 (“Accession has the same legal effect as ratification,
acceptance or approval.”).
113
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, at arts. 76–77 (describing
the role of treaty depositories).
114
U.N. Office of L. Affairs, Treaty Section, Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General
as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, at 39, U.N. Doc. ST/Leg/7/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.
E.94.V.15 (1994), https://perma.cc/5VSL-JRUF [hereinafter 1994 Depositary Practice of the
U.N. Secretary-General].
115
For an example of a treaty that does specify the answer, see Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on European Union art. 50(5), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 (providing that if a
State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, “its request shall be subject to the
procedure referred to in Article 49,” which in turn specifies that a new state can join the
European Union only with the unanimous agreement of member states, all of whom must
ratify a treaty of admission).
116
For example, prior depository information for the Whaling Convention indicated that
New Zealand is considered to have ratified the treaty, withdrawn from it, and then acceded to
it. Status of International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 70. In 2019,
the State Department streamlined its online depository information for the Whaling
Convention and removed mention of past withdrawals for countries that had since rejoined,
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All this may matter because the Senate sometimes advises and consents
to the ratification of a treaty and sometimes to accession to a treaty. If it
has advised and consented to accession in the first place—as is the case
with some important multilateral treaties117—then this would pose no
textual concern for rejoining, as rejoining would also be done through
accession. But what if the Senate’s original resolution of advice and
consent is to the ratification of a multilateral treaty? Will this present a
bar to rejoining?
The most straightforward way around this issue would be for the
executive branch to rejoin the treaty by submitting an instrument of
ratification (rather than accession) to the treaty depository. This approach
would be in tension with some practice, but in keeping with other practice.
A treaty depository might well accept such an instrument as valid, either
independently or in the absence of objection from state parties.118 As
mentioned above, the Vienna Convention has no specific provision
see Dep’t of State, International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
https://perma.cc/D6PY-DH9D, so this information is drawn from an earlier version. By
contrast, Sweden is listed on the depository website as having “ratified” on its second goround the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military
Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality. See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and
Practice 160 (2d ed. 2007) (noting Sweden’s prior round of ratification and describing this
second joining as a “re-acceding”); Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 043,
Council of Europe (last updated Sept. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/PUU3-NRQW (not marking
Sweden as having “acceded” the second time round and not giving any indication that Sweden
re-signed the treaty following its initial withdrawal). In his treatise, Anthony Aust uses both
“re-ratification” and “re-accession” as terms. Aust, supra, at 121, 159–60.
117
See, e.g., S. Exec. Journal, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 799 (1934) (advising and consenting “to
the adherence by the United States” to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, commonly known as the Warsaw Convention); S.
Exec. Journal, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 596–97 (1968) (advising and consenting “to accession to
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”); 114 Cong. Rec. 29,605 (1968) (advising and
consenting “to accession to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards,” commonly known as the New York Convention).
118
It strikes me as unlikely that other states would object to the use of ratification rather
than accession by the United States. Where states have registered objections to the rejoining
of treaties by other states, it is likely to be because of a new reservation attached by the
rejoining state. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Comm., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin.,
Iceland Rejoining International Whaling Commission (May 15, 2002), https://perma.cc/S4TW-FXB5 (describing how the United States and other countries resisted Iceland’s attempt
to rejoin the Whaling Convention conditional on a reservation allowing it to engage in
commercial whaling notwithstanding a moratorium imposed under the Convention); U.N.
Treaty Collection, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, https://perma.cc/8M6P-4JGZ (recording various objections to a new reservation
entered on August 26, 1988 by Trinidad & Tobago as it rejoined the Optional Protocol, from
which it had withdrawn that same day).
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regarding the correct international legal process for rejoining and nor is
the specific treaty in question likely to resolve this issue. The general
default in international law is to find state behavior permissive in the
absence of a specific prohibition,119 and here the lack of international legal
clarity suggests that either accession or ratification should be permitted.120
Indeed, the practice of the U.N. Secretary-General’s office, as described
by it in 1994, left open the prospect that instruments of ratification and
accession might be interchangeable in some circumstances.121 The treaty
depository might therefore be willing to treat the rejoining as a ratification
or, in the alternative, accept the deposit of the instrument of ratification
but then reclassify this instrument as it saw fit.
Even were an instrument of accession the only option for rejoining a
treaty as a matter of international law, domestic practice suggests that the
executive branch likely has the latitude to interpret accession to be
authorized by a Senate resolution advising and consenting to ratification.
The Senate’s core interest in a treaty, after all, lies in its content rather
than the form by which it will be joined as a matter of international law.
Indeed, the words “ratified” and “ratification” are often used in U.S.
practice to refer broadly to joining a treaty rather than to the specific
international legal process of ratification.122 As a matter of past practice,
119

See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 19 (Sept. 7).
Cf. Termination or Suspension by Notice, 14 Whiteman Digest of Int'l L., ch. 42, § 37,
at 446 (quoting a 1961 memorandum from the State Department’s Assistant Legal Adviser for
Treaty Affairs that “if as a result of the notice of termination, [a] state has ceased to be a party
to the treaty, it can become a party again only by depositing an instrument of ratification or an
instrument of adherence as required by the terms of the treaty”).
121
1994 Depositary Practice of the U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 114, at 39 (qualifying
the non-interchangeability of instruments or ratification and accession with the word
“normally” and also noting that, in deciding how to act on this issue in a particular instance,
“the Secretary-General is guided by the relevant provisions of the agreement involved and by
the intent of the Government in this regard”).
122
The Senate generally refers to its resolutions of advice and consent as “resolutions of
ratification.” S. Doc. No. 113-18, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 R. XXX(2) (2013) (providing only
for treaty “ratification” and containing no provision for accession or other forms of joining);
see also CRS Report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supra note 20, at 123
(discussing the form of committee recommendations on treaties). This includes some
occasions on which the Senate is advising and consenting to accession. E.g., 114 Cong. Rec.
29,605 (1968) (making the “resolution of ratification” the question for a vote, although the
text of the resolution was advising and consenting to accession to the New York Convention);
see also Function of Legislative Body, 14 Whiteman Digest of Int'l L., ch. 42, § 8, at 57 (“With
rare exceptions, the Senate has followed [its rule for acting through a “resolution of
ratification”] regardless of the terms of the treaty, which may provide for adherence or
accession in the case of a nonsignatory or for acceptance or approval by either signatories or
120

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

112

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 106:73

on occasion the executive branch has seen fit to interpret Senate
resolutions with a margin of flexibility for the international legal
formalities. The Digest of International Law prepared in 1970 under the
direction of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs observes that
“[u]sually, in transmitting the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent,
the President will follow the terminology of the treaty itself,” but that “it
would not be considered improper, however, regardless of the
terminology of the treaty, for the President to request advice and consent
to ratification, bearing in mind particularly the Senate’s standing rule
[which refers only to ratification].”123 To give a few examples: the
executive branch has ratified a treaty where the Senate advised and
consented to accession,124 accepted a treaty where the Senate advised and

nonsignatories.”). Nor is the Senate the only branch of government to use “ratification”
broadly. The Supreme Court, for example, had described the United States as having ratified
the Warsaw Convention, although acceding would be the correct term as a matter of
international law. See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 649 n.4 (2004) (remarking
on the text that “was before the Senate when it consented to ratification of the [Warsaw]
Convention in 1934”); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 245
(1984) (describing the Warsaw Convention as “an international air carriage treaty that the
United States has ratified”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has even on occasion inaptly described
the Senate as the ratifying actor, even though ratification (and accession) are done by the
executive branch. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991) (describing
the Senate as having “ratified the [Warsaw] Convention in 1934”); Air France v. Saks, 470
U.S. 392, 397 (1985) (mentioning the text that was “before the Senate when it ratified the
[Warsaw] Convention in 1934”).
123
Function of Legislative Body, 14 Whiteman Digest of Int’l L., ch. 42, § 8, at 57
(observing more generally that “[i]n the United States, when the agreement is one that has
been sent to the Senate as a treaty, it has been customary for the President, after Senate advice
and consent, to execute an instrument of ratification, then for such instrument to be deposited
in accordance with the relevant terms of the treaty as constituting an instrument of ratification,
adherence, acceptance, accession, or approval, as the case may be”).
124
Compare S. Exec. Journal, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 597–98 (1972) (recording the Senate’s
advice and consent “to accession to the Protocol to the International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries”), with Protocol Relating to the Facilitation of Entry into Force
of Amendments to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Oct. 6,
1970, 1082 U.N.T.S. 276, 279 (identifying the United States as having ratified this treaty
rather than joined it through some other process). For another example, compare S. Exec.
Journal, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 218, 220 (1968) (recording the Senate’s advice and consent “to
accession by the United States of America to the Convention on the International
Hydrographic Organization”), with Convention on the International Hydrographic
Organization, Sept. 13, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1857, 1928 (describing the Senate as having given its
“advice and consent to the ratification of [this] Convention” and proclaiming the treaty to have
been “ratified by the President of the United States”).
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consented to ratification,125 and even in one instance joined the United
States to a treaty where the Senate’s advice and consent applied to an
earlier, though substantively identical, version of the treaty.126 This
practice constitutes pragmatic recognition that the international legal
process specified in the Senate resolution may differ from the process
actually employed.
A further set of considerations tied to international law has to do with
material changes to the treaty that have occurred since the Senate’s advice
and consent. If the Senate has advised and consented to the INF Treaty
“between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics,”127 could the President take that advice and consent as
applicable to rejoining the INF Treaty with Russia and the other former
Soviet Republics in light of international law on state succession?128 What
if a schedule to the treaty or the treaty itself is amended by the parties
after the U.S. withdrawal and before its rejoining? What if the treaty turns
on some underlying predicate assumption that no longer applies? These
are the kinds of international issues that lawyers in the U.S. State
Department would have to consider on a case-by-case basis in deciding
whether the President could lawfully rejoin a treaty on the basis of the
original resolution of advice and consent. These are also issues on which
there would likely be prudential concerns as well as legal ones.
One last international legal issue bears mention with respect to the
rejoining of some multilateral treaties. There are some foundational
multilateral treaties that condition the entry of new members on the
consent of existing members. The U.N. Charter and the North Atlantic
125

Compare 118 Cong. Rec. 27,925 (1972) (advising and consenting “to the ratification of
the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property”), with UNESCO Depository Information,
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, https://perma.cc/GCP7-2B8D (listing the United States as
having joined by an instrument of acceptance rather than ratification).
126
Proclamation on the Agreement Between the United States and Other Powers for the
Repression of the Trade in White Women, 35 Stat. 1979 (1908) (noting that the eventual treaty
was comparable “word for word, and without change” to the one to which the Senate advised
and consented); see also Adherence, 5 Hackworth Digest of Int'l L., ch. 16, § 474, at 78
(describing this incident). For other examples of flexibility with respect to terminology, see
those listed in Function of Legislative Body, 14 Whiteman Digest of Int'l L., ch. 42, § 8, at
57–58.
127
S. Exec. Journal, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 366 (1988).
128
See Williamson & Osborn, supra note 72 (discussing how the executive branch relied on
the law of state succession to deem such treaties as continuing in force with the successors to
the Soviet Union following its fall).
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Treaty are two exceptionally important examples. The U.N. Charter
provides that those countries that participated at its negotiating
conference, signed, and ratified it are “original Members,” while all other
countries require the approval of both the General Assembly and the
Security Council to join.129 The North Atlantic Treaty uses the term
“Parties” to describe the original signatories who ratified the treaty plus
any “European state” that subsequently accedes with the unanimous
agreement of the existing parties.130 Neither treaty has any specific
language about original members who withdraw and then seek to
rejoin.131 Should the United States withdraw from one of these treaties
and then seek to rejoin it, there would be complex diplomatic and legal
conversations about whether it would need the same consent from other
states that a truly new member would need. (Decision-making on this
front might well fall in the first instance to the depository, which, for both
the U.N. Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, happens to be the
government of the United States.132) This is an international legal issue
that is independent from the domestic legal question of whether further
advice and consent of the Senate is needed for the United States to rejoin
a treaty, but it is nonetheless a very important issue.
3. New Legislation Is Needed to Implement the Treaty
A third set of limits on rejoining treaties has to do with their
implementation. As a matter of practice—and sometimes as a condition

129

U.N. Charter arts. 3–4.
North Atlantic Treaty art. 10, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
131
By contrast, the Treaty on European Union makes clear that rejoining states shall be
treated as new members on rejoining. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union art. 50(5), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13. The U.N. Charter does not even have a
withdrawal clause, although there was an understanding at its negotiating conference that
withdrawal was permissible under exceptional circumstances, though strongly discouraged.
For discussion, see generally Hans Kelsen, Withdrawal from the United Nations, 1 W. Pol. Q.
29, 29–30 (1948) (noting that “the Charter does not contain provisions for withdrawal” and
the ability of member states to withdraw because of “exceptional circumstances”).
The North Atlantic Treaty permits a country to withdraw “[a]fter the Treaty has been in
force for twenty years” upon one year’s notice. North Atlantic Treaty art. 13, Apr. 4, 1949, 63
Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
132
See U.N. Charter art. 110; North Atlantic Treaty arts. 10–11, 13, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat.
2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; cf. Termination or Suspension by Notice, 14 Whiteman Digest of Int'l
L., ch. 42, § 37, at 459 (noting that the “denunciation by a depositary government of a
multilateral treaty . . . to which it is a party does not affect its status under the provisions of
the treaty . . . as the depositary authority”).
130
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of the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent—the President typically
does not ratify a treaty in the absence of legal authority to implement it.133
For some treaties, congressional legislation is required for their
implementation. By way of example, the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”)
obligates state parties to “enact . . . the necessary legislation . . . to
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide.”134 Prior to
ratification by the United States, Congress implemented this provision
through the passage of the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of
1987.135 Sometimes implementing legislation is passed not to create new
enforcement mechanisms but rather to modify pre-existing legislation that
might otherwise present a barrier to the treaty’s implementation. For
example, prior to the ratification of two bilateral treaties related to trade
in defense-related materials, the executive branch needed to obtain
congressional legislation that modified a pre-existing law on defenserelated exports.136
Implementing legislation has a complex relationship with treaty
withdrawal—one whose contours are not fully defined. On the one hand,
implementing legislation might serve as a barrier to withdrawal if it is
interpreted to prohibit withdrawal without congressional approval137 or if
133

Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties—A Cinderella Story, 102 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 412, 414
(2008) (“[T]he Executive almost always waits for Congress to enact [implementing]
legislation before joining the treaty.”). For an example of a Senate resolution of advice and
consent conditioned on the passage of future implementing legislation, see 132 Cong. Rec.
2349–50 (1986) (requiring “[t]hat the President will not deposit the instrument of ratification
until after the implementing legislation . . . has been enacted”).
134
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
art. 5, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
135
Pub. L. No. 100-606, 102 Stat. 3045 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2018)). While
the Supremacy Clause makes treaties the supreme law of the land, a non-self-executing treaty
such as the Genocide Convention does directly give rise to judicially enforceable law.
Implementing legislation is often passed to fill this gap. For a discussion of the complicated
and controversial distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, see
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 310 (Am. Law. Inst. 2018). For a discussion
of ways in which statutes implement treaty obligations, see generally John F. Coyle,
Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 Va. J. Int’l L. 655 (2010) (discussing
methods of incorporation).
136
See Jean Galbraith, Making Treaty Implementation More Like Statutory Interpretation,
115 Mich. L. Rev. 1309, 1357–58 (2017) (discussing these bilateral treaties with Australia and
the United Kingdom and the passage of the implementing legislation).
137
No U.S. court has addressed whether or under what conditions implementing legislation
might serve as implied congressional disapproval of unilateral presidential withdrawal.
Looking across the Atlantic, the U.K. Supreme Court recently held that the government of the
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it remains operative after withdrawal and thereby limits the impact of
withdrawal.138 The legislation implementing the Genocide Convention,
for example, has no sunset provision, and it seems reasonable to assume
that genocide would remain a crime under U.S. law even were President
Trump to withdraw the United States from the Genocide Convention.139
On the other hand, there are situations in which presidential withdrawal
from a treaty will have the secondary effect of suspending or potentially
terminating the implementing legislation. The implementing legislation
for extradition treaties, for example, provides that it “shall continue in
force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with [a] foreign
government.”140
Just as the executive branch plans for implementation prior to joining
a treaty, so the executive branch will need to plan for implementation
prior to rejoining a treaty. In most cases, this will not present a substantial
barrier. Many treaties do not need implementing legislation,141 and, for
those treaties that do need implementing legislation, it is likely that the
pre-existing implementing legislation will remain operative and continue
to suffice for implementation. Nonetheless, there will need to be treatyUnited Kingdom needed the consent of Parliament to withdraw from the European Union in
light of pre-existing legislation that had implemented the U.K. participation in the European
Union. R v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [88]–[93] (appeals
taken from Eng. and N. Ir.).
138
Koh, supra note 9, at 454 (expressing skepticism of unilateral termination where it
“would similarly necessitate unwinding many domestic law statutes that the executive could
not repeal alone”); see Catherine Amirfar & Ashika Singh, The Trump Administration and the
“Unmaking” of International Agreements, 59 Harv. Int’l L.J. 443, 457–58 (2018) (arguing
that in the absence of an express termination clause in implementing legislation, treaty
withdrawal may not necessarily trigger the expiration of implementing legislation). It is an
open question whether, as a constitutional matter, the President could withdraw the United
States from a treaty despite the existence of a statute (or Senate resolution of advice and
consent) obligating him or her to obtain legislative approval prior to withdrawal. See
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 313 reporters’ note 6 (Am. Law. Inst. 2018).
139
See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-606, 102 Stat.
3045 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2018)).
140
18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2018). For a past example in the tariff context of a law whose
applicability is tied to the non-termination of a treaty, see An Act to Reduce Internal-Revenue
Taxation, ch. 121, 22 Stat. 488, 525–26 (1883) (“Nothing in this act shall in any way change
or impair the force or effect of any treaty between the United States and any other government,
or any laws passed in pursuance of or for the execution of any treaty, so long as such treaty
shall remain in force . . . ; but whenever any such treaty . . . shall expire or be otherwise
terminated, the provisions of this shall be in force in all respects in the same manner and to
the same extent as if no such treaty had existed at the time of the passage hereof.”).
141
See, e.g., Treaty Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, Austl.-U.S., Sept. 5, 2007, S.
Treaty Doc. 110-10 (2007) (“[T]his Treaty is self-executing in the United States.”).
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specific due diligence to assess whether any implementing legislation
might be needed and, if so, what course of action should be pursued.
C. Practical Implications
The President’s authority to rejoin treaties is not a complete
counterweight to the President’s authority to withdraw from treaties. Of
the limitations discussed above, the most common ones will be
international rather than domestic. Most importantly, rejoining may be
difficult or impossible for bilateral treaties and for multilateral treaties
where rejoining requires the consent of the treaty partners. But for most
of the multilateral treaties that undergird the global order, rejoining will
be readily available to the President at the international level—just as it
was when the United States rejoined UNESCO and the ILO. Presidents
who so choose can re-engage the United States with these multilateral
treaties and the international organizations to which they give rise.
To date, presidents have been cautious in withdrawing from core
multilateral treaties. The main exception has been with respect to treaties
and treaty provisions through which the United States accepts the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. In 1985, the Reagan
administration withdrew the general U.S. acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction,
following the ICJ’s decision on jurisdiction in a case brought by
Nicaragua against the United States.142 In 2005, following the ICJ’s
decision in a case brought by Mexico against the United States, the
142

Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute provides that parties “may at any time declare that they
recognize . . . the jurisdiction of the Court” with respect to international legal disputes between
themselves and other states that have made similar declarations. Statute of the International
Court of Justice art. 36(2). In 1946, the Senate passed a resolution of advice and consent “to
the deposit by the President of the United States . . . of [such] a declaration.” S. Exec. Journal,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 719 (1946) (including the condition, discussed supra note 90 and
accompanying text, that the declaration would apply for five years and then be withdrawable
by the United States upon six months of notice); see also Michael J. Glennon, Nicaragua v.
United States: Constitutionality of U.S. Modification of ICJ Jurisdiction, 79 Am. J. Int’l L.
682, 682 (1985) (noting that “the weight of the evidence suggests that [this declaration] was
seen by the Senate as a treaty”). President Truman accordingly deposited this declaration. See
Declaration Respecting Recognition by the United States of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice, 61 Stat. 1218 (1946). The Reagan administration added a
further condition (without having obtained additional advice and consent) just before
Nicaragua filed its case. See Letter from U.S. Secretary of State to the U.N. Secretary-General,
Apr. 6, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 670 (1984). After the ICJ held it had jurisdiction in the case, the
executive branch gave notice in 1985 that the United States was terminating its acceptance of
the ICJ’s general jurisdiction (effective six months later in 1986). See Letter from Secretary
of State George P. Shultz to U.N. Secretary-General, Oct. 7, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
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George W. Bush administration gave notice of U.S. withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, a treaty that provided
for ICJ jurisdiction with respect to disputes involving consular
relations.143 And in 2018, the Trump administration withdrew the United
States from the equivalent protocol for the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, following Palestine filing a case against the United
States.144 In October 2019, John Bolton, President Trump’s then national
security advisor, announced that the United States is considering
withdrawing from more treaties or optional clauses to treaties that provide
for ICJ jurisdiction.145
Just as Presidents Reagan, George W. Bush, and Trump unilaterally
undertook these withdrawals, so could a future President reverse these
decisions and rejoin. There has been no intervening action by the Senate
or Congress with respect to the ICJ that would have the effect of rendering
the original resolutions of advice and consent ineffective. In a 1990
statute, Congress did mention that in 1985 the United States had
terminated its general acceptance of ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.146 But
this was in the course of a statutory section whose purpose was to convey
the “Sense of Congress” that it “commends and strongly supports efforts
by the United States to broaden, where appropriate, the compulsory
jurisdiction and enhance the effectiveness of the International Court of

143
See U.N. Treaty Collection, Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, https://perma.cc/RRA3-4QXZ
(containing depository information); John Bellinger, Thoughts on the ICJ’s Decision in Iran v
United States and the Trump Administration’s Treaty Withdrawals, Lawfare (Oct. 5, 2018,
11:30 AM), https://perma.cc/ZW9H-ZJP3 (quoting the letter of withdrawal sent by the United
States).
144
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, Trump
Administration Announces Withdrawal from Four International Agreements, 113 Am. J. Int’l
L. 132, 133–34 (Jean Galbraith ed., 2019). The withdrawal from the bilateral treaty with Iran
was also largely in response to a case brought by Iran against the United States in the ICJ
pursuant to the dispute settlement provision in the treaty. Id. at 132–34.
145
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sarah Sanders, Small Business Administrator Linda
McMahon, and National Security Advisor, White House (Oct. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/Y8HP-WLNL (“[W]e will commence a review of all international agreements that may
still expose the United States to purported binding jurisdiction dispute resolution in the
International Court of Justice.”).
146
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-246
§ 411, 104 Stat. 15, 69 (1990).
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Justice.”147 In deciding whether to rejoin, however, the President would
have to consider the risk that the ICJ would issue a judgment adverse to
the United States that the executive branch lacked the capacity to
implement. No immediate implementing legislation would be needed to
accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, but the Supreme Court held in 2008 that
congressional legislation would be needed for enforcement of ICJ
judgments to be given effect as such by the courts of the United States.148
The executive branch might well be able to give effect to most ICJ
decisions respecting diplomatic relations on its own, but ICJ jurisdiction
over international legal issues generally and over consular rights
specifically might result in judgments that the executive branch would
lack the power to implement. If a future President was interested in
rejoining one or more of these ICJ jurisdictional provisions—and that
would of course be a policy judgment—he or she would presumably
consider these issues of implementation as a matter of prudence.
As to other multilateral treaties, the practical significance of the
authority to rejoin depends on what President Trump does next. I am
hopeful that President Trump will not withdraw the United States from
the North Atlantic Treaty. If he does, then this might be the exceptional
treaty that could command a veto-proof majority from Congress to oppose
removal or two-thirds of the Senate to swiftly approve rejoining.149 If such
support failed to materialize, however, then his successor could rely as
domestic legal authority for rejoining on the original Senate resolution of
advice and consent (and the subsequent Senate resolutions approving the
accession of additional member states). More generally, if President
Trump does not withdraw the United States from other treaties, then the
147

Id. This same statute also noted the fact of U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO and expressed
the “sense of the Congress” that the Secretary of State should seek to “promote the progress
necessary to justify United States consideration of reentry into UNESCO.” Id. § 408, 104 Stat.
at 67–68.
148
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526–27, 532 (2008) (holding that the executive
branch could not require Texas to act in a manner that would satisfy the international legal
obligations of the United States that stemmed from an ICJ decision regarding the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations unless Congress enacted statutes implementing the
decision as domestic law).
149
The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, for example, passed
Congress with veto-proof majorities and included a section expressing Congress’s “sense”
that it wished “to affirm that the United States remains fully committed to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.” Pub. L. No. 115-44, § 292, 131 Stat. 886, 939–40 (2017). As noted
supra note 132 and accompanying text, there is an initial question of whether the United States
would need the consent of the other treaty parties to rejoin.
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power to rejoin can continue to lie mainly on the shelf. If President Trump
pulls out the wrecking ball, then this power will take on far greater import.
III. REJOINING TREATIES AND THE BROADER DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS POWERS
Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State for President Truman,
emphasized the essential need for norms of non-partisanship with respect
to foreign policy. He wrote in his memoirs:
The perhaps apocryphal sign in the Wild West saloon— “Don’t Shoot
the Piano Player”—was the basic idea of nonpolitical foreign policy.
[Foreign policy] must be built on a broad conception of the national
interest . . . . The Constitution makes the President the piano player of
foreign policy, but unless his immunity from assault with intent to kill
is extended to members of either party who work with him in the
legislative branch, no consistent foreign policy is possible under the
separation of powers.150

Acheson then acknowledged and celebrated the impressive degree of
bipartisan cooperation between the President and the Senate in forging of
the post-World-War-II world order.
That era is now gone, and we do not know if, when, or how it will
return. There is no immunity in foreign policy, for the President or anyone
else. A far more fragmented set of views about what constitutes the
national interest inevitably makes the President appear as a combatant
rather than a piano player. This in turn gives rise to two unappealing
alternatives under our constitutional system. On the one hand, to require
new approval from Congress or two-thirds of the Senate for major foreign
policy decisions is to leave these decisions unmade. The presidential
system of government, the requirement of bicameralism (for legislation)
or two-thirds of the Senate (for a treaty), and committee control over
legislation makes such legislative action challenging under any
circumstances and nearly impossible under conditions of severe
partisanship. Yet on the other hand, to allow the President full and free
rein in the foreign policy space raises concerns about the rule of law,
fulfils Acheson’s prediction of inconsistent foreign policy, and risks
making our foreign relations as good—or as bad—as the person who
holds the office.
150

Acheson, supra note 69, at 95–96.
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The scholarly debates over the President’s power to withdraw the
United States from treaties demonstrate the unsatisfying nature of both
alternatives. In a recent article, Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith give
treaty termination as an example of the rise of presidential power with
respect to U.S. engagement with international law.151 Yet while they
express normative concerns with the rise of presidential control,152 they
do not seem eager to develop or return to a legal framework by which the
President cannot undertake major foreign policy actions without
legislative approval. Rather, the main reform they are willing to propose
is more transparency. For treaty termination, that would take the form of
requiring the executive branch to “publish all treaty terminations once
they become effective” in some searchable manner.153 By contrast, Harold
Koh would require the approval of Congress or two-thirds of the Senate
for treaty withdrawal under his proposed mirror image rule. But he
implicitly acknowledges the functional difficulties that would come with
this approach in certain contexts and argues that President Carter’s
unilateral withdrawal from the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan was in
fact constitutionally defensible.154
The doctrinal argument made here about rejoining treaties does not
negate the difficult question of whether we should trust more in
congressional or presidential control. But it does suggest that there are
meaningful checks on presidential power for treaty rejoining, even where
current congressional oversight is limited. In addition to the political
check of public opinion, there are four checks grounded in law and legal
process.
The first check on rejoining treaties is the need for the original Senate
resolution of ratification. The power to rejoin treaties discussed here is
not an unbounded power with respect to treaty-making. It is not the power
to make new international agreements or to modify the terms of existing
ones. (The President does have important powers along these lines, but
151
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 18, at 1224 (“Since the early twentieth
century . . . Presidents have come to dominate treaty termination just as they have the making
and interpretation of treaties.”).
152
See id. at 1272–79.
153
Id. at 1293; see also id. at 1294 (discussing the possibility of more robust reporting
requirements with respect to withdrawal but noting that the value of them “is difficult to
speculate about in general terms”).
154
Koh, supra note 9, at 466 (defending the constitutionality of this unilateral treaty
termination, notwithstanding his mirror principle, on the ground that this decision was tied to
the exercise of the recognition power, which is an exclusive presidential prerogative).
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not based on the doctrine discussed in this piece.) Rather, the power to
rejoin treaties is the power to do again something that a bipartisan supermajority of the Senate specifically authorized and never repealed. The
original Senate resolution of advice and consent is an authorization, but it
is also a check, bounded and consistent with how the rule of law operates.
The second check with respect to rejoining treaties is the mostly
democratic electoral process that governs the selection of U.S. Presidents.
This check is an important one—so important, indeed, that Eric Posner
and Adrian Vermeule have suggested that it is the main check on modern
presidential power.155 If presidents can not only unilaterally withdraw the
United States from treaties but also unilaterally rejoin these treaties, then
the democratic process provides an eventual check on both withdrawal
and rejoining. Presidents who withdraw the United States from treaties
based on an ill-informed, erroneous, or even malevolent reasoning can
have their judgments reversed through rejoining by their successors. And
presidents who rejoin the United States to treaties based on ill-informed,
erroneous, or even malevolent reasoning can have their judgments
reversed through later withdrawal by their successors.
The third check with respect to rejoining treaties stems from
administrative and potentially judicial legal process. There is a formalized
process within the State Department, known as the C-175 Procedure, that
applies to the making and termination of international agreements.156 The
C-175 Procedure sets forth a framework for internal deliberation, calls for
congressional consultation with respect to process, requires due diligence
to consider whether implementing legislation is needed, and provides for
publication of the treaty.157 The C-175 Procedure would likely be used for
rejoining treaties. Although it does not specifically state that it is
applicable in this context, it is an umbrella process applied to international
agreements generally. As it is silent on the specific issue of rejoining
treaties, it seems likely that it would be used in such a situation. The C175 Procedure reduces the likelihood that treaties will be arbitrarily
rejoined and provides an administrative process through which
155
See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian
Republic 4–5 (2010). This check is of course tied to public opinion, but implemented through
the legal framework of the Constitution’s provisions on presidential elections.
156
See U.S. Dep’t of State, 11 Foreign Affairs Manual §§ 720–27, https://perma.cc/AT2SKFZB (last updated Sept. 25, 2006); see also Coordination, Reporting, and Publication of
International Agreements, 22 C.F.R. § 181 (2018) (setting forth regulatory provisions that
complement this process).
157
See 11 Foreign Affairs Manual, supra note 156, §§ 722(2–5), 723.3(3–5), 723.4, 727.
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consideration of treaty-specific limitations on rejoining will be
considered. In addition to the C-175 process, the legality of rejoining
might be subject to judicial review, conditional on there being a plaintiff
with standing. Although Goldwater v. Carter found the issue of treaty
withdrawal to be non-justiciable, the reasoning underlying that decision
is in tension with subsequent Supreme Court precedent.158 Future courts
might well find both treaty withdrawal and treaty rejoining to be
justiciable questions.
These three checks are neither new nor unique to the issue of treaty
rejoining. They lie more generally at the heart of the domestic
administrative state. The U.S. domestic regulatory apparatus relies on a
combination of decades-old statutes, implementation through delegated
authority that varies across administrations, and checks based on both
administrative process and judicial review.159 It may not be the best
system that one could devise, but it is a system that strikes a reasonable
balance between the presidential system established in the Constitution,
the values of the rule of law, and the need for functioning government. It
is a balance that is not found in all issues of foreign relations law. Some
areas of foreign relations law, most notably the President’s power to
authorize the use of force abroad, rely heavily on unregulated presidential
power. Other areas of foreign relations law, such as the President’s power
to make international agreements other than treaties, strike a wellcalibrated balance but do so in ways that have only partial parallels to the
administrative state. But where the parallels are direct, as with rejoining
158
Justice Powell’s concurrence in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979), rested
on ripeness grounds and on concerns about challenges by individual members of Congress to
presidential actions. This concern would not appear to apply to private plaintiffs with standing.
As for the plurality opinion in Goldwater, it relied on a broad view of the political question
doctrine. See id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (deeming “the basic question”
to be “‘political’ and therefore nonjusticiable because it involve[d] the authority of the
President in the conduct of [the] country’s foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate
or the Congress [was] authorized to negate the action of the President”). By contrast, in its
2012 decision in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Supreme Court found that the issue of whether the
President or Congress had ultimate control over the power to recognize foreign nations was
not a political question. 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012) (noting that “the Judiciary must decide if
Zivotofsky’s interpretation of [a] statute is correct, and whether the statute is constitutional”
and that “[t]his is a familiar judicial exercise”). Notably, the majority opinion in Zivotofsky v.
Clinton did not discuss or cite Goldwater v. Carter. See id. at 191–202.
159
Indeed, just as the issue of withdrawal is becoming increasingly important in the treaty
context, so too is it receiving increased attention in regulatory context. See, e.g., Cary
Coglianese, Gabriel Scheffler & Daniel E. Walters, Unrules 8 (Aug. 3, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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treaties, then we can feel confident that we are operating under a system
that is known to work, even if imperfectly.
The fourth check to treaty rejoining comes from the international legal
process. The consequences of withdrawal and rejoining a treaty are
different from withdrawing and then remaking a regulatory rule. Both
situations give rise to uncertainty and risk-management challenges for
those affected. But unlike in the regulatory context, rejoining may not
always be legally possible for treaties, particularly bilateral ones. Also
unlike in the regulatory process, treaty withdrawal and rejoining affects
U.S. relations not simply with regulated entities, but also with sovereign
partners. The reputation of the United States in terms of stability and trustworthiness would likely be damaged by a high degree of treaty
withdrawal and re-entry. A President deciding whether to rejoin the
United States to a treaty would have to consider whether rejoining would
be worth it as a matter of international relations given the ability of a later
President to re-exit the treaty.
The checks identified here with respect to treaty rejoining may seem
individually weak, but they are almost certainly stronger than the checks
on presidential treaty withdrawal. And in the context of treaty withdrawal,
it has been striking how rarely presidents have exercised this power over
time. Perhaps this is because most treaties entered into with the advice
and consent of the Senate are in fact good for the United States; perhaps
this is because of an innate preference for the status quo by presidents and
the institutions within which they operate; or perhaps it is because of
domestic or international checks along the lines outlined above. If
President Trump does follow through more generally on his signaled
interest in treaty withdrawal, this will be a departure from traditional
norms. It will not be his only such departure from existing norms.160
Understanding future presidents to have the power to rejoin treaties
provides a mechanism for revisiting any departures from norms with
respect to treaty withdrawal. To return to Dean Acheson’s analogy, this
will save the piano for the next player.

160
See generally Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 2187
(2018) (discussing various presidential norms that President Trump has not followed).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Much of constitutional practice focuses on making law. There is less
on how to dismantle law, and still less on how to rebuild it. We know how
to do, but what does it take to redo the undone?
The Trump administration has yet to run its course, but it seems clear
that there will be rebuilding on many fronts at the end of it. With respect
to treaties, we do not yet know how many will be undone before the end
of President Trump’s tenure. By the time the next President takes the oath
of office, however, the tally will be clear. Should that President deem
certain treaty withdrawals by President Trump or his predecessors to be
unwise, then, subject to the limitations discussed earlier, he or she may
promptly rejoin the United States to these treaties without the need for a
second round of advice and consent from the Senate. This conclusion is
textually supported, well-grounded in cognate practice, and structurally
sound. If President Trump has the unilateral power to withdraw, then his
successor does and should have the unilateral power to rejoin.

